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In  1996 the Commission published a 'Report on the Situation of Oil Supply, Refining and 
Markets in  the European Community',  (COM(96)143).  This report drew attention to the 
over-capacity and poor profitability of the refining industry in Europe. 
With the strategic importance of refining in mind, DG XVII of the European Commission 
appointed Roland Berger and Partner to carry out the present study to better understand 
the  reasons  for  continued  low  profitability  in  the  industry;  to  examine  whether  this 
represents a threat to the  public interest in  the EU;  and,  to suggest possible solutions. 
The Terms of Reference are set out in detail in the companion volume of Appendices to 
this report. 
This study is presented in three booklets, this Executive Summary, the Main Report, and 
Appendices. The Terms of Reference are set out in detail in the Appendices. 
In  conducting  this  study  we  have  analysed  data  and  forecasts  produced  by  the 
Commission, the International Energy Agency, the oil  industry, oil  industry associations, 
financial  analysts,  and  other  commentators  on  the  refining  industry  in  Europe  and 
worldwide.  We have  also  conducted  interviews with  energy  ministries  of EU  member 
states, and with the majority of oil refining companies in the EU. 
The  views  presented  in  this  study  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of the  European 
Commission. 
2.  An overview of the conclusions 
2.1  General Comments 
The European Commission has established three main pillars of Energy Policy: 
•  Competitiveness 
•  The Environment 
•  Security of Supply 
This report on the oil refining industry addresses all three of these issues. 
Oil  provides 42%  of the  European  Union's (EU)  energy requirement,  and  94%  of the 
fuels required for transport.  The health and  viability of the refining  industry is  of critical 
strategic  importance  to  the  Union  for  maintaining  a  successful  and  internationally 
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competitive  position  for  industry  as  a  whole,  and  for  providing  competitively  priced 
products to consumers. 
The refining industry has an  important role to play in assisting the EU  meet increasingly 
stringent environmental targets. The  investments required  for an  effective response to 
this  challenge  are  potentially  enormous,  which  in  turn  require  a  financially  and 
technically strong industry. 
The continuous supply of refined products is critical for the strategic interests of the EU. 
With the European refining industry now almost entirely owned by private shareholders, 
the strategic interests of the industry and of governments are no longer necessarily the 
same.  Decisions taken a few years ago by many refiners on  the basis of social  impact 
are now more likely to be driven by considerations of shareholder value. 
2.2  Capacity and Profitability 
Even  in  the  most favourable  scenario,  European  refining  capacity will  almost certainly 
exceed demand for at least the next decade. International trading opportunities will only 
have a limited impact on Europe's overcapacity. 
There is a refining capacity surplus of 70-100 million tonnes per annum (equivalent to 9 
to 13 refineries) in the EU. 
Estimated  after-tax  return  on  capital  employed  in  EU  refining  has  on  average  been 
about 4%.  This includes the favourable effect of the  Gulf War.  This level  is  too low to 
sustain long term viability. 
The Gross Refiners Margin in North West Europe has averaged about $2/bbl (ECU  1.75 
per barrel) over the past five years,  compared to the $3.25- $3.75/bbl (ECU 2.85-3.25 
per barrel) needed for a financially healthy industry. 
Over-investment  in  Catalytic  Cracking,  combined  with  rising  diesel  demand  at  the 
expense of gasoline has further distorted product balances and refining margins. 
The cost of refinery closure is high and discourages the normal economic processes for 
correction of overcapacity and poor profitability. 
Continuation of poor profitability into the long term will lead to diversion of investment to 
other regions and business sectors. A few refinery closures will occur, but not enough to 
significantly alter margins.  Eventually a vicious circle will  set in,  with  European  refining 
becoming uncompetitive in the global oil market. 
Putting off necessary action to tackle the structural problems now is  likely to lead  to a 
more painful enforced restructuring at a later date. 
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2.3  Other key factors 
The need to produce higher specification fuels to meet EU environmental aspirations will 
impose a major investment burden on the industry with little or no return. 
Refining  is  highly capital  intensive.  Its  impact on  EU  employment  levels,  which  have 
been  declining over many years,  is  relatively small and  has been  declining over many 
years. 
2.4  Potential solutions and impact 
We analysed a number of possible solutions from the point of view of the public interest 
as  well  as  resolution  of the  industry's  problems.  None  of the  initiatives  examined  are 
sufficient on their own to correct the problems of the industry. 
The nature of the solutions required is such that the major initiatives need to be taken by 
the oil companies themselves. 
There is  an  important role to be  played by the  European Commission and  by  member 
state governments in encouraging and facilitating these actions. 
The most attractive actions which have a significant impact are: 
•  A significant restructuring of the European refining industry, to remove structural 
overcapacity. Action to achieve this has to come from the industry itself. 
•  Introduction  of  tax  differentiation  to  incentivise  a  switch  towards  more 
environmentally friendly fuels. 
•  An industry-financed fund for closures. 
•  Correction of distortions between member states in fuel specifications and taxes, 
and in remediation standards for closure. 
•  Increased transparency in reporting and accounting for refining industry results in 
Europe. 
In the short term a restructuring of the scale envisaged would tighten margins through a 
small rise in consumer prices for oil products. The potential for prices to rise is limited by 
competition from  imports.  In  the  longer term  cost savings from  new investment would 
more than offset this price rise and be passed on to consumers. 
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The  price  cap  set  by  imports  would,  in  our  view,  mean  that  the  industry  as 
currently  structured,  will  be  unable  to  realise  better  than  a  7-8%  ROCE  on 
average, other than during periods of external supply disruption. 
2.5  Key recommendations 
Our key recommendations are as follows: 
•  The  Commission,  through  DGXV/1,  should  kick-start  a  more  urgent  impetus  for 
restructuring  by the  refining  industry through  convening  a  top  level  management 
exchange of  views. 
•  A final attempt should be made to establish an industry-financed closure fund. 
•  The  Commission should reassess the year 2005 indicative target fuel specifications 
(as  is  planned  through  the  Auto-Oil  2  programme),  on  the  basis  of  cost-
effectiveness. 
•  Governments  should  introduce  tax  differentials  within  Commission  guidelines  to 
encourage  early phasing in  of agreed new specifications and to  improve  refiners' 
return on the necessary investment. 
•  Steps should be taken by the Commission and governments to identify and remove 
distortions and create a 'level playing field' for oil refining. 
•  New  accounting  disclosure  rules  should  be  developed  so  that  integrated  oil 
companies show separate results for refining operations in annual accounts 
Further recommendations are set out in section 5 below. 
3.  Analysis 
3.1  Europe has a history of refining overcapacity and low profitability 
Refining distillation capacity decreased substantially in the early 1980's following the oil 
price  shocks  of the  1970's.  At the  same  time,  the  industry  had  to  invest  heavily  in 
conversion capacity to destroy fuel oil and rebalance demand. 
Official figures for nameplate capacity show small further capacity reductions to the end 
of 1995. Combined with a slow rise in  demand since  1986 this  has increased apparent 
distillation capacity utilisation from a low point of 60% in  1981  to an average above 90% 
now, higher in northern Europe and lower in southern Europe. 
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Despite this rise in capacity utilisation, refining margins in Europe have remained low for 
the last two decades apart from sporadic periods of oil supply crises. 
There are differences in supply and  demand balances between different countries, with 
Germany in  particular having  a large supply deficit.  Growth  of oil  products demand  in 
Iberia  has  been  well  above  the  average  for  the  EU,  particularly  in  transport  fuels. 
However, oil demand growth in the 1990's shows the Mediterranean region to be  in  line 
with the rest of Europe. 
3.2  The return on refining is not sufficient to sustain a viable industry 
With the exception of non-integrated  refiners,  the  oil  industry avoids  publicly reporting 
European  refining  results  separately  from  marketing.  Despite  this  almost  all  of  the 
companies  have  separate  management  accounts  for  controlling  their  refining 
businesses. 
Nevertheless,  a number of financial  and  independent industry benchmark analysts  do 
conduct  reviews  of the  separate  sectors  of integrated  oil  company  operations.  From 
these sources it is possible to estimate refining profitability. 
Estimated return on refining capital employed in Europe has been running at around 2% 
to  6%  p.a.  since the  Gulf War.  Only a few  niche  refiners  have  been  able to  generate 
returns in the 1  0% to 15% range. 
The  average  of about  4%  return  on  capital  employed  is  even  below  normal  utility 
returns.  For comparison  the  petrochemical  industry has  averaged  8%  return  over the 
last 20 years (lower during the 1990's). 
Oil  companies  now  generally  set  themselves  targets  of 12  - 15%  return  on  capital 
employed  or higher for  downstream  refining  and  marketing.  This  reflects  the  higher 
returns  that  are  available  to  multinational  companies  from  alternative  investments  in 
other sectors. 
Our view is that European refining operations would need to return on average about 10 
to 12% after tax on existing capital employed in order to maintain shareholder value. An 
internal rate of return of around 8% is needed for new investment projects. 
The average returns  currently achieved  do not provide an  adequate return  on  existing 
investment,  and  cannot  justify  new  investment  in  refining  capacity  except  in  special 
cases. 
Gross refining  margins in  North West Europe which  have  been  running  at about ECU 
1. 75  per barrel  ($2.00/bbl) would  need  to  rise  by  a further ECU  1.10-1.50 per barrel 
($1.25-1.75/bbl)  to  justify  new  capacity  investment  on  existing  sites  ('brownfield' 
investment). 
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3.3  Does it really matter that refining investment is not viable? 
The increasing efficiency of international oil trading markets means that the oil  industry 
increasingly operates as a global commodity market. 
The fierce  international competition that this engenders  means that consumers  benefit 
through  low  net-of-tax  prices.  Why  should  this  situation  be  changed?  Surely,  the 
argument goes, oil companies are rich enough to carry poor refining results? 
Integrated  oil  companies  have continued  to  support their marketing  networks  through 
their own refineries, despite concerns about very low margins in refining. 
However,  many  oil  companies  have  been  increasingly  criticised  by  shareholders  for 
mediocre profitability results overall,  and  a spotlight has  been  put on  under-performing 
sectors or regions, for instance the downstream sector generally, and European and  US 
refining. These sectors are increasingly considered as destroyers of shareholder value. 
Efficient oil  trading  has  also  reduced  the  logic for vertical  integration  in  the  industry. 
While few large oil  marketing  companies would  like to  risk  having  no  refineries,  many 
companies' results would improve if they had a significantly less refining capacity. 
A  recent  development  in  Europe  is  that  there  are  very  few  companies  in  which 
governments still have a shareholding. The recently privatised oil companies are already 
behaving more commercially and less on social grounds. 
One  result  of these  changes  is  a  marked  reluctance  to  invest  in  European  refining. 
Some are directing new investment elsewhere.  Many refineries are now run  on  a 'Care 
and  Maintenance'  basis  only.  This  risks  a  drop  in  safety  standards,  and  a  lagged 
response to the need to improve environmental standards. 
If the present level of poor profitability persists, a few refinery closures will  occur - but 
not enough to significantly alter margins.  Eventually a vicious  circle will  set in.  Lack of 
new investment in  refining  may,  over time,  put the EU  industry technically behind other 
expanding areas of the world and could harm long-term global competitiveness. 
As with other strategic sectors of industry that have gone into structural decline, putting 
off  the  necessary  corrections  now  is  likely  to  lead  to  a  more  painful  enforced 
restructuring at a later date. 
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3.4  Demand is rising but excess capacity will not disappear 
Taking the  scenarios for energy demand  prepared  by the  European  Commission,  and 
comparing  these to  forecasts  of capacity adjusted  by  'Capacity Creep',  show  primary 
distillation capacity likely to remain in surplus beyond 2010 (see Figure 1  ).  A majority of 
oil companies we have interviewed share these conclusions. 
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Figure 1  EU Refining Capacity and Commission Demand Forecasts 
An  alternative view,  put forward  by the  lEA and  some other analysts,  foresees  higher 
demand and slower capacity creep - leading to the EU moving into oil product deficit by 
around 2007. This still gives no short-term relief to the industry. 
In addition the environmental pressures have not diminished. There is potential for more 
severe regulation of energy use following the Kyoto discussions. 
We  therefore  support  the  view  that  there  will  be  continuing  capacity  surplus  in  EU 
refining unless substantial further closures are made. Our estimate is that some 70 -100 
million  tonnes  of primary distillation  and  associated  capacity would  need  to  be  closed 
(about 9-13 full-sized refineries) to achieve maximum utilisation. 
Refining  profitability  has  also  been  harmed  by  excess  gasoline  production  - primarily 
because  the  industry  over-invested  in  catalytic  cracking  capacity  during  the  1980's, 
anticipating gasoline demand growth.  Instead fast growth of diesel  for passenger cars 
hit gasoline demand.  This  trend  was  initiated  by tax incentives,  but as  diesel  engines 
have advanced demand is  no longer solely a function of tax differentials. The resultant 
gasoline surplus and  diesel  shortage  is  not likely to  be  reversed  in  the  medium term, 
even if tax policies in favour of diesel are reversed. 
European  refineries  compete  in  a global  market.  Improvements  in  refining  margins  in 
mid 1997 reflect increasing gasoline demand from the US. However, this improvement is 
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not a structural  gain  for EU  refining.  With slower growth  in  the  Far East,  EU  gasoline 
exports to the US  are vulnerable to  increased supplies from the  Middle East and  even 
from the Far East. 
Supply and demand developments in  other regions of the world are therefore not likely 
to provide relief to the overcapacity in Europe over the medium to long term. 
3.5  There are structural reasons for the inadequate level of returns 
Marginal  pricing  behaviour is  the  essential  mechanism which  puts  downward  pressure 
on  prices. At capacity utilisations between 85% and  95%,  marginal costs are far below 
average costs. At the margin there is a strong incentive to maximise output and  sell an 
extra barrel - even at very low prices.  The general use of Linear Programming models 
encourages this short-term thinking. 
Average price levels tend to settle around a margin which is a little above average fixed 
and  variable operating costs (approximately equivalent to  'cash  costs').  Contribution to 
capital  is  rarely considered  in  day-to-day decisions.  As  a result virtually no companies 
achieve a reasonable return on existing assets, and  new investment cannot be justified 
on a stand-alone basis. 
Amongst integrated oil  companies there is  cross-subsidisation  between  marketing and 
refining,  and  in  some cases from  upstream to  refining.  Although integrated companies 
see some refining capacity as essential to secure marketing sales,  the trading  markets 
have become so efficient that there is little synergy in covering all marketing needs from 
own refining. 
A key reason for persistence of low returns is the high costs of closure  in  the industry, 
which can amount to between ECU50 million and ECU200 million for a refinery. Average 
closure costs are estimated at ECU100 million: 40 million typically for social costs,  and 
60 million for environmental clean-up.  This high  cost encourages the continuation of a 
number of poorly performing or loss-making refineries. 
Margins  have  been  further  damaged  by  the  imbalance  between  gasoline  and  diesel 
supply and  demand.  The  growing  surplus  of gasoline  has  reduced  margins  available 
from upgrading. 
Adequate  returns  will  not  be  achieved  without  restructuring  to  remove  the  distillation 
capacity  surplus.  As  supply  for  individual  products  becomes  tight,  price  peaking  will 
occur, driving up wholesale prices, and therefore margins. 
However,  with  an  efficient global  market  for  refined  products,  any  higher  margins  in 
Europe will draw in  imports. This sets a price cap on the extra margin that tighter supply 
in  Europe  could  cause.  We estimate this  to  be  about ECU  0.8  per barrel  ($0.90/bbl) 
above current levels. This is equivalent to about 0.005 ECU  per litre (half an  ECU  cent) 
on final consumer prices. 
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Due  to  increasingly  sophisticated  trading,  the  point  at  which  prices  start  to  rise 
significantly has over the past decade moved much closer to full capacity utilisation. This 
limits  the  benefits  from  an  individual  closure.  At  present  utilisation  several  refineries 
have to close before an appreciable effect on margins will occur. 
3.6  Environmental regulations increase the burden on EU refining 
The European Council's 'common position' of June  1997 proposed  more stringent fuel 
specifications for the  year 2000,  and  indicative targets  for 2005.  These  specifications 
are  subject  to  further  conciliation  between  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Parliament. 
The  oil  industry  estimates  that  on  top  of a  20  billion  ECU  cost  to  meet  the  2000 
standards,  it would  cost about a further 25  billion  ECU  to implement the  2005 targets 
proposed by the Council. 
Even  if the  forecasts  are  overstated,  this  will  be  a huge  cost for an  underperforming 
industry. As argued above, the oil industry pricing mechanisms will not normally be able 
to recover additional investment costs. 
Without some  change  to  this  position,  some  companies  will  only  invest  part  of their 
needs  to  meet the  new  specifications.  Some  refineries  will  close.  This  would  reduce 
overcapacity, but not enough to raise margins in current conditions. 
An  alternative to mandatory specification changes for 2005 would  be tax differentiation 
(as is currently applied between leaded and  unleaded gasolines. This would  provide an 
incentive  for consumers  to  change  fuels,  and  for some  return  in  the  early  years  for 
refiners that invest to meet the new specifications. 
Tax differentiation at appropriate levels would  also provide a mechanism for smoother 
phasing-in of new specifications. However, the benefit to refiners of tax-differentiation is 
temporary rather than structural, as the competitive process will erode away gains once 
a substantial majority of consumers have switched to the new fuel. 
Some of the specifications proposed for 2005 require a particularly high investment cost 
without  demonstrably  showing  substantial  gains  in  air  quality.  A  second  Auto  Oil 
programme has  now to  evaluate the  cost effectiveness of measures under discussion 
for 2005. 
3.7  Oil companies are making some strategic changes- but not enough 
Most European refiners are concentrating on  similar strategies of cost reduction. While 
this adds to the  long term trend of real  price  reductions to consumers,  the competitive 
process is not giving any lasting benefit from this to the refiners themselves. 
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Restructuring  of  the  European  refining  industry  needs  to  be  driven  hard  by  the 
companies  themselves  if structural  problems  are  to  be  significantly  improved.  So  far 
there has been much less impetus to this in Europe than, for instance, in the USA. 
The notable exception is BP and  Mobil's European joint venture, and  a small number of 
regional  mergers  and  alliances,  such  as  the  Mira  joint  venture  of two  refineries  in 
Karlsruhe. 
3.8  Security  of  supply  depends  on  access  to  crude  oil  more  than  refining 
capacity 
Continuous  supply  of oil  products  is  vital  to  the  EU.  A  very  large  deficit  of refining 
capacity in the EU as a whole would put supply at risk, but such an outcome is not under 
consideration in this study, and will not occur for the foreseeable future. 
The issue is whether security of supply is at risk when refinery capacity is in deficit. 
In these supply disruption circumstances it is access to crude oil  and feedstocks, rather 
than specifically the location or capacity of refineries that is critical for security of supply. 
An  appropriate  policy  for  strategic  stock  levels  is  also  critical,  as  is  access  to  and 
flexibility of distribution infrastructure. 
The  level  of refining  cover  needed  to  insure  against severe  supply disruption  ranges 
between 70 and 90% of consumption over the EU as a whole. This is well below current 
EU refining capacity. 
Austria,  Denmark,  France,  Germany, and  Ireland all  operate satisfactorily with  a deficit 
of refining  capacity.  In  the  case  of Germany and  Ireland  this  is  quite  large  (75%  and 
53% cover respectively). 
For  a  major  external  oil  supply  disruption,  access  to  crude  oil  or  feedstocks  will 
determine the level at which the EU refining industry will be able to operate. 
Strategic  stocks  are  vital  to  cushion  the  initial  disruption.  The  current  90  days  level 
seems  satisfactory,  provided  the  stock  indeed  exists,  although  a  lower level  may  be 
appropriate  for  net  exporters.  Member  states  do  not  yet  see  the  issue  on  a  pan-
European basis, and  the mechanisms and stock levels for strategic stock management 
need revision. 
Access to,  and  flexibility  of infrastructure  is  important,  whether this  is  pipelines,  road, 
rail,  shipping  or depots.  Recent strikes  in  France  showed  that  it was  where  products 
were  stored  and  how  they  were  moved  rather  than  where  they  were  refined,  which 
secured local supply. 
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If there is a severe crude shortage, those who have access to crude will find no difficulty 
in  renting  spare refining  capacity globally to  refine  that crude,  provided  they also  can 
transport the crude and products. 
3.9  Employment in EU refining is small relative to other strategic industries 
Employment effects of any changes  in  refining  are a serious  concern  to  governments 
and  the public.  However,  refining  is  a highly capital  intensive industry which  has  been 
reducing  manpower  levels  over  many  years.  At  about  90,000,  the  number of direct 
employees in refining are small compared with other strategic industries. Even if 10% of 
capacity were cut, the direct numbers released would  be about 9,000 and would have a 
minor effect across the 15 EU members. 
There are however a very few cases where a small local community is over-dependent 
on  employment  by  a  particular refinery.  Government  redeployment  policies  would  be 
needed in such cases if any closure were to be considered. 
3.10  Solutions need to take competition considerations into account 
There is widespread concern in the industry about being seen to do anything that could 
be construed as anti-competitive. This is getting in the way of sensible restructuring. We 
have therefore examined competition implications with DGIV. 
The Commission's stance on  competition policy does allow scope for restructuring, and 
a  clear  understanding  needs  to  be  reached  between  DGIV  and  the  industry.  This 
includes conditions under which an industry-funded closure fund could be set up.  There 
is a role to be  played  by the Commission in  identifying and  removing  hidden incentives 
and exit barriers that prevent economically desirable refinery closures. 
4.  Summary of interviews with the industry and governments 
Much  of the  analysis  was  tested  in  interviews  with  oil  companies  and  government 
bodies, and is summarised below. 
We  conducted  interviews  with  twenty-two  oil  companies,  seven  other  oil  industry 
organisations, and eight governments, generally at Chief Executive,  EU  downstream or 
refining  director  level.  Further  input  was  sought  from  other  governments  through  a 
structured questionnaire. 
4.1  Views of oil companies 
There  is  wide  agreement  that  profitability  has  been  structurally  too  low and  that  the 
major,  but  not  the  only,  cause  is  excess  capacity.  There  is  a  widely  held  view  that 
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capacity creep  could  be  up  to 1.5% pa  and  that the  possibility of demand  catching  up 
with capacity without substantial new closures is remote. 
Views  on  the  level  of excess  capacity  that  needs  to  close  in  the  short  term  varied 
between 5 and  15 refineries, with some also seeing the need for an ongoing programme 
of closure into the longer term. 
There  were  divergent  views  on  an  industry  closure  fund,  with  many  companies 
ambivalent or against.  Some companies were supportive, seeing that reducing  the exit 
costs to zero would be a win-win situation, that is: 
•  Governments gain environmentally because the number of refineries is  reduced 
and the closed sites are cleaned up 
•  Closers gain because their costs are partly or fully paid 
•  Stayers gain because, for a one-off  investment of say ECU 0.23/bbl ($0.25/bbl), 
the market will harden, perhaps by up to ECU 0.9/bbl ($1.00/bbl) 
There was  almost universal agreement that any closure fund  should  be  funded  by the 
industry, not by governments as in the case of the steel industry restructuring. 
Any realistic range of closures is seen as having no detrimental effect upon security of 
supply, 'which  instead  depends  more  upon  access to  crude  oil  and  feedstocks  and  to 
distribution infrastructure. 
There  is  wide  support for a  rigorous  process  of cost-effectiveness  analysis,  such  as 
Auto-oil-1, in determining the required industry actions to meet tightening environmental 
requirements.  There  is  an  equally  forceful  view  that  the  Auto-oil  1  process  became 
distorted by political over-rides at the end.  Very serious concern  was  expressed  about 
the likely cost to the industry, and  the poor cost-effectiveness to the Community which 
could result. 
4.2  Views of oil industry, other than oil companies 
Industry bodies and  other organisations agreed with the views on  the oil  companies in 
most areas. 
Capacity creep, triggered  by environmental investment, was almost universally seen  at 
between 1 to 1.5 % pa or more. As one oil technology company, with a view at the high 
end of the range, put it: 
"We should know,  we are in the creep business" 
The unlevel playing field for environmental standards and taxation was seen as needing 
harmonisation. 
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Security of supply was not seen as a refining capacity issue; independent traders were 
confident about the  industry ability to  cover demand  at much  lower  levels  of refining 
capacity. 
4.3  Views of government ministries 
The  governments  interviewed  generally  preferred  free  market  approaches  for  most 
issues and supported the concept of a single market in oil products. 
One government (with substantial domestic refining) emphasised that the industry must 
put over a sense of urgency, stating: 
"The industry must establish a sense of  urgency, and work on this with politicians 
and the public.  We receive few complaints from industry; there is no momentum." 
There is strong support from governments for reversing diesel's fiscal advantages. One 
wanted the Commission to take a much tougher line on tax harmonisation generally. 
There is  some support for measures to share the closure cost of refineries across the 
industry.  A  fund  modelled  on  the  successful  Dutch  service  station  closure  fund  was 
mentioned by more than one. 
On the environment one government was forceful in its view that: 
"We are very concerned.  The  2005 specifications are not justified and will be a 
high cost to the industry." 
There  was  significant  concern  about  the  employment  effect  of  closures  in  some 
countries. This was often linked to specific local communities where a refinery was the 
main  employer,  rather  than  on  the  total  numbers  likely  to  be  released  which  were 
accepted as relatively low. 
5.  Evaluation of possible initiatives 
5.1  Continuation of existing policies 
We examined whether the  Commission  should just continue  existing  macro-economic 
and energy policies and take no extra specific steps to solve the refining issue. 
These policies include, for example: 
Extension of the internal market 
European Monetary Union 
Liberalisation of energy markets 
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Harmonisation of taxes, with a principle of neutrality between energies 
Assessing environmental standards on the basis of cost-effectiveness 
Our conclusion  is  that without some  intervention  by the  Commission  there will  be  no 
significant breakthrough  by  the  industry  itself in  overcoming  poor refining  profitability. 
This risks leaving an increasingly uncompetitive industry in a key strategic sector. 
5.2  Possible initiatives 
We evaluated a number of possible initiatives under 5 categories: 
•  'Soft Options' to reduce costs to the industry 
•  Stringent but realistic environmental specifications - with a cost recovery mechanism 
for refiners 
•  EC encouragement of an industry 'shake-out' 
•  Removal of distortions to create a 'level playing field' 
•  Changing the profit and pricing signals in the industry through greater transparency 
Other initiatives were rejected as being too interventionist or as clearly being against the 
public interest. 
Our conclusions were that: 
•  None of  these initiatives are sufficient on their own to correct the problems of  the 
industry. 
•  The major initiatives need to be taken by the oil industry itself 
•  Aspects of  the solutions can be assisted by the European Commission 
5.3  Preferred actions 
The most attractive actions which will have a significant impact appear to be: 
•  Encouragement of significant industry restructuring 
This  will  require  tough  decisions  by  many members  of the  industry,  and 
can  be  strongly  influenced  by  the  Commission.  Member states  (at  both 
national and local level) need to avoid too parochial a response. 
•  Introduction  of  tax  differentiation  to  incentivise  a  switch  towards  more 
environmentally friendly fuels 
Some  refineries  are  currently  in  a  poor  position  to  upgrade  to  new 
environmental standards. Such sites should be allowed to close. 
The  alternative  of  support  through  tax  allowances  on  environmental 
investment  would  discriminate  against  those  companies  which  have 
already invested. 
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•  An industry-financed fund for closures. 
It will be difficult to get industry agreement for this, and agreement of DGIV 
will  also  be  required.  There  is  a  risk  that this  will  merely  lead  to  further 
delay  and  discourage  early  restructuring.  A  tight  deadline  would  be 
necessary. 
•  Correction of distortions between regions and fuels, and in remediation standards for 
closure. 
This is in line with single market policies, but much remains to be done. 
•  Increased transparency in refining industry reporting to shareholders. 
This  will  have  significant  opposition  in  the  industry.  However  it  could 
provide a powerful longer term focus on  underperforming assets.is in  line 
with single market policies, but much remains to be done. 
6.  Recommendations 
Our recommendations are therefore as follows:-
6.1  The  Commission, through DGXVII,  to kick-start a  more urgent impetus for 
restructuring  by bringing  together  all  the  interested  parties  from  the  refining 
industry, member state governments, and the European Parliament in a top level 
management exchange of views. 
6.2  One follow-up exchange to be held about a year later at which the industry 
and the Commission would report on progress. 
6.3  The Commission will carefully reassess the year 2005  indicative target fuel 
specifications as already planned through the Auto-Oil II  programme, in order to 
agree truly cost-effective measures. 
6.4  The resultant agreed specification changes from the year 2000 levels should 
not be  introduced as  mandatory specifications, but to be  gradually introduced 
some  time  after  January  2000  by  regulating  an  EU-wide  tax  differentiation 
between old and new specifications. 
6.5  A  final  attempt should  be  made to establish  an  industry-financed  closure 
fund, with a time limit. 
6.6  General ground rules to be set to prevent local distortions in the application 
of requirements for control of refinery emissions, which should be based on cost-
effectveness criteria. 
6. 7  Closure  costs  to  be  based  on  the  sensible  application  of objective  and 
harmonised environmental risk-based criteria for the remediation of a site and an 
extended time allowed for implementation. 
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6.8  Unless there are exceptional circumstances, remediation to be to industrial 
re-use standards, not for horticulture or housing. This would best be harmonised 
by the Commission providing closure guideline standards across Europe. 
6.9  The  Commission  to  give  serious  consideration  to  capping  a  company's 
environmental liabilities once clean-up has been independently audited as having 
been completed to the required standards. 
6.10  Steps  to  be  taken  by the  Commission  and  governments  to  identify and 
remove distortions and create a level playing field across member states for oil 
refining. 
6.11  New  accounting  disclosure  rules  to  be  developed  so  that  integrated  oil 
companies show separate divisional post-tax results for refining  operations  in 
annual accounts. 
6.12  A  review  of the  accounting  treatment of write  downs of non-performing 
refining assets to be undertaken. 
7.  Potential 'quick hits' 
Early identification of some 'quick hits' for local restructuring, mergers, or closures would 
give impetus to the required restructuring. This could be a subject for the management 
exchange of views meeting. 
As a starter for discussion we propose the following for consideration: 
•  France (South-East refinery cluster)- already explored, but needs new impetus 
•  Germany (Bavaria)- partial restructuring already, but could go further 
•  Ireland  (Whitegate) - any closure would  need  the  security of guaranteed  supplies 
from a European refiner, preferably with direct access to North Sea crudeoil. 
A  number  of  other  potential  areas  for  restructuring  which  would  require  deeper 
evaluation are set out in the main report and appendices. 
8.  Potential impact of  the recommendations 
In  the short term a restructuring of the required scale could  lead to a removal over the 
next 5 to 7 years of 70-100 million tonnes of capacity (10-15%). 
This reduction of capacity would tighten margins through a small rise in consumer prices 
for oil  products.  The potential for prices to  rise  is  limited  by competition from  imports. 
We believe  this  will  cap  any margin  increase  to  about  0.8  ECU  per barrel  ($0.9/bbl) 
above current levels equivalent to 0.005 ECU per litre on final consumer prices. 
In  the longer term cost savings from  new investment would  more than  offset this price 
rise and be passed on to consumers. 
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Tax  differentiation  on  the  change  in  fuel  specifications  between  2000  and  the 
specifications eventually agreed for 2005 would  operate  by  imposition of a higher tax 
rate  on  the  2000  specifications.  (To  neutralise  the  tax  effect,  tax  on  the  cleaner fuel 
should also be reduced). We calculate the differential needed would be about an extra 3 
ECU cents/litre on  'dirty' diesel, and  about 2.0 ECU  cents/litre on  'dirty' gasoline. Some 
of the  differential would  be  passed  on  to  consumers  to  create  a financial  incentive to 
switch. Most would be kept by the refiners. The effect of the differential will disappear as 
the majority switch to the new fuel. 
Removing  distortions  would  improve  the  efficiency  of market-led  restructuring,  while 
accounting transparency would prolong the margin benefit of efficient restructuring. 
The price cap set by imports would, in our view, mean that the industry as 
currently structured, will be unable to realise better than a 7-8% ROCE on 
average, other than during periods of external supply disruption. 
In order to avoid further destruction of shareholder value, individual refineries will need 
to search for profitable niche positions, or achieve superlative cost performance relative 
to the industry. 
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ACCOUNTING 
1  EUROPA 1  COMMISSION' DG XV 1  Company Law. Accounting & Auditing f1 Accounting 
Full text for downloading (PDF format) 
Accounting: Interpretative Communication concerning 
Directives on annual and consolidated accounts 
An Interpretative Communication on a number of  issues dealt with in the 
main EU Accounting Directives has been adopted by the European 
Commission. The Communication aims to give guidance to bodies 
responsible for seUing accounting standards in the Member States, to 
accounting professionals and to investors and other users of  company 
accounts. Consolidated accounts, the relationship between the Directives 
and International Accounting Standards and environmental issues in 
financial reporting are the three main issues are covered by the 
Communication. The Communication is based upon extensive contacts with 
representatives of  the Member States and accounting professionals. 
Basic EU-wide rules on the preparation and presentation of  companies' annual accounts and 
the consolidated accounts of  groups of  companies are laid down respectively in the Fourth 
and Seventh Company Law Directives (78/66/EEC and 83/349/EEC). The Communication 
clarifies the meaning of  a number of  the Directives' provisions in the light of  developments 
which have been taken place since their adoption. It forms part of  the new accounting 
strategy adopted by the Commission in 1995. This strategy aims to improve comparability 
of  accounts drawn up by companies in different Member States and integrate European 
accounting harmonisation efforts into a broader context of  harmonisation at the international 
level, thereby facilitating EU companies' access to international capital markets. 
On consolidated accounts, the Communication deals with the parent-subsidiary 
relationship, the exclusion of  a subsidiary from the scope of  the consolidation and the 
relationship between annual and consolidated accounts. 
Concerning the relationship between the Directives and International Accounting 
Standards, the Communication borrows from the work of  the special Task Force which 
was set up on this subject by the Contact Committee on the Accounting Directives. The 
comparison undertaken by the Task Force between the EU Accounting Directives and 
International Accounting Standards (lAS) did show that they were compatible in all but a 
few non-significant cases. The Communication reaffirms that where companies want to 
produce consolidated accounts also satisfying the requirements ofiAS or US Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), this is only possible to the extent that the 
consolidated accounts remain in conformity with the EU Directives. 
Finally, the Communication includes some clarifications on the inclusion of  environmental 
issues in the financial statements. For example, it confirms that environmental risks or 
liabilities resulting from past transactions or events qualify for recognition as a provision in 
the balance sheet if  the company has a legal or contractual obligation to prevent, reduce or 
repair environmental damage or ifthe company's management has committed itself to doing 
1122/98 9:46AM Accounting: Interpretative Communi  ... n annual and consolidated accounts  http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/company/compta/commen.htm 
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so. The Commission intends to issue at a later date a separate Recommendation on 
environmental matters in financial reporting. 
The Communication reflects conclusions arrived at in the Contact Committee on the 
Accounting Directives (chaired by the Commission and comprising Member State 
representatives) and discussions in the Accounting Advisory Forum (comprising 
representatives of  standard-setting bodies and of  interested professions). 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission has established three main pillars of Energy Policy: 
•  Competitiveness 
•  The Environment 
•  Security of Supply 
This report on the oil refining industry addresses all three of these issues. 
Oil provides 42% of the European Union's (EU) energy requirement, and 94% of the fuels 
required for transport. The health and viability of the refining industry is of critical strategic 
importance  to  the  Union  for  maintaining  a  successful  and  internationally  competitive 
position  for  industry  as  a  whole,  and  for  providing  competitively  priced  products  to 
consumers. 
The refining  industry has  an  important role  to  play in  assisting the EU  meet increasingly 
stringent environmental targets. The investments required for an effective response to this 
challenge  are  potentially  enormous,  which  in  turn  require  a  financially  and  technically 
strong industry. 
The continuous supply of refined  products is  critical for the  strategic interests of the EU. 
With the  European  refining  industry now almost entirely owned  by  private shareholders, 
the  strategic interests of the  industry and  of governments are  no  longer necessarily the 
same. Decisions taken a few years ago by many refiners on the basis of social impact are 
now more likely to be driven by considerations of shareholder value. 
In  1996 the Commission published a 'Report on  the Situation of Oil  Supply,  Refining and 
Markets  in  the  European  Community',  (COM(96)143).  This  report drew attention  to  the 
over-capacity and poor profitability of the refining industry in Europe. 
With the  strategic importance of refining  in  mind,  DGXVII  of the  European  Commission 
appointed Roland Berger & Partner to carry out the present study to better understand the 
reasons for continued low profitability in the industry; to examine whether this represents a 
threat to the public interest in the EU; and, to suggest possible solutions. 
This study is  presented  in  three booklets,  an  Executive Summary,  this Main  Report,  and 
Appendices. The Terms of Reference are set out in detail in the Appendices. 
In  conducting  this  study  we  have  analysed  data  and  forecasts  produced  by  the 
Commission,  the  International  Energy Agency,  the  oil  industry,  oil  industry associations, 
financial analysts, and  other commentators on  the  refining  industry in  Europe and  world-
wide.  We have  also  conducted  interviews with  energy ministries of EU  member states, 
and with the majority of oil refining companies in the EU. 
The  views  presented  in  this  study  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of  the  European 
Commission. 
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2.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
2.1  EUROPE HAS A HISTORY OF REFINING OVERCAPACITY AND LOW PROFITABILITY 
Since the early 1980s OECD  Europe distillation capacity has reduced from  1050 Mtpa to 
under 700 Mtpa. Most of this decline took place in the early 1980's. However, demand has 
also fallen  over that  same  period.  While  demand  has  been  increasing  since  1985,  the 
current (1996) position is still one of surplus against nameplate capacity of some 70 Mtpa 
(Figure 2-1 ). 
Figure 2-1 
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The resulting distillation capacity utilisation has also increased from a low point of 60% to 
91% now in  Europe overall (Figure 2-2).  Note that these utilisation figures are also based 
on nameplate capacity, an aspect we will discuss in detail. 
There are differences  in  supply and  demand  balances  between  different countries,  with 
Germany  in  particular  having  a  large  supply  deficit.  Growth  of oil  products  demand  in 
Spain  has  been  well  above  the  average  for  the  region,  particularly  in  transport  fuels. 
However,  in  the  1990's oil  demand  growth  in  the  Mediterranean  region  as  a whole  has 
come into line with the rest of Europe.  Distillation capacity utilisation in the Mediterranean 
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countries of Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,  and  Spain  remains lower than  the  rest of the  EU  at 
around 85%. 
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Figure 2-2  Capacity utilisation for OECD Europe (Throughput % of capacity) 
Despite the increasing utilisation, margins over the past decade have generally remained 
low - reflecting continuing over-capacity. Apart from at times of supply crisis, such as the 
Gulf War,  the  Brent  Complex  Refining  Margin  at  Rotterdam  has  languished  at  around 
$2/bbl (ECU  1.75 per barrel),  (Figure 2-3).  Even  during the Gulf War supply crisis,  much 
faster intelligence, advanced IT capability and  sophisticated trading and  hedging activities 
resulted  in  a  relatively  modest  upturn  in  consumer  prices,  and  hence  in  margins, 
compared to earlier crises. 
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Figure 2-3  Annual average refining margins for NWE Brent crude 
1996 
The impact of over-capacity, easy access to crude oil supplies and  intense competition in 
the markets, both refinery gate and retail, has been to depress profitability. 
2.2  THE RETURN ON REFINING IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VIABLE INDUSTRY 
The Commission observed in COM(96)143 that: 
"...  to  sustain  industrial  development  in  the  sector  (refining)  it  is  not 
sufficient to merely cover cash costs." 
We agree. 
2.2.1  Historical profitability 
Industry has traditionally been guarded about the level of profitability in  different business 
sectors,  regarding  this  as  commercially  sensitive.  There  is  little  included  in  company 
annual  reports about the  Return  On  Capital  Employed  (ROCE) in  the  European  refining 
sector.  Indeed  in  the  reports  of the  majors  the  reference  is  typically  to  Downstream 
Profitability  world-wide.  Whether  more  openness  might  assist  the  industry  to  achieve 
higher profitability is discussed in section 4.2.5. 
Notwithstanding this,  there  is  a range  of solid  evidence to support the  case that refining 
profitability is low.  Industry bench-marking exercises indicate a range of 1% to 6.5% pre-
tax  ROCE  for  refineries  in  the  bottom  and  top  quartiles  in  1994.  Fleming's  analysis 
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calculated  an  average  refining  return  of  4%  post-tax  1991-1996.  Other  investment 
analysts talk of similar figures for refining in Europe. 
The many oil  companies to whom we  have talked  indicate an  industry range for average 
performers of between 2 and 6%  ROCE,  post tax, over the last 5 years with a total range 
of, say, -5 to +15% ROCE. 
There  are  industry  players  who  have  profitable  niches.  Two,  who  have  strong  product 
niches appear to  be  at the  higher end  of the  range.  There  are a few other refiners with 
particular geographical or niche advantages who achieve post tax returns above 10%. 
European  oil  companies  as  a group  make  good  returns  on  their total  activities,  but this 
includes  high  returns  on  upstream  exploration  and  production  (including  a  number  of 
companies who are mainly or exclusively in the upstream), and  in some cases, on  non-oil 
activities.  Comparison  of annual  report figures  with  large  companies  in  other industries 
show oil generally performing well  (Figure 2-4 ).  This is reflected in the general perception 
of the  public  and  of some  governments  who  regard  oil  industry  concerns  about  poor 
refining performance as an example of "crying wolf'. 
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Figure 2-4  Profitability (pre-tax ROCE) of other industry sectors in Europe 
However, the estimated average ROCE post-tax of 4% (5% pre-tax) for refining in Europe 
show that this part of the business is performing very poorly against key industries. Out of 
industries shown in  Figure 2-4, only Automobile and Bulk Chemicals have produced worse 
individual years than the average results for oil  refining. Overall, chemicals has averaged 
6.4 % ROCE  over the  six year period,  (8%  ROCE  over the past 20 years for European 
petrochemicals).  Automobile  has  averaged  5%,  and  Utilities  7.8%.  The  complexity  and 
technological  exposure  of refining  should  be  similar to  automotive  and  chemicals  (both 
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industries  which  have  their  own  problems  of structural  poor  profitability).  However,  oil 
refining  has higher risk and  complexity than utilities, and  should  be  aiming to exceed the 
long term returns for this sector. 
In  summary, the refining  part of the oil  industry in  Europe has suffered unacceptably low 
profitability for many years,  and  this  performance  compares  unfavourably to  the  returns 
achieved in other industrial sectors. 
We  discuss further  in  section  2.4  whether the  EU  should  continue  to  rely  on  this  poor 
performance being subsidised by the high upstream earnings of integrated oil companies. 
2.2.2  Acceptable/desirable profitability in Europe 
What level would be regarded as acceptable? 
Comparison with other similar industry sectors gives one criterion. 
Another criterion  is  to  look at weighted  average cost of capital  (WACC) to  establish  the 
return below which refining operations would be destroying shareholder value. Because of 
historically  low  continental  European  interest  rates  this  criterion  has  fallen  over  recent 
years. We calculate that for refining activities the relevant WACC for European refiners is 
now about 7.5%  to  8%.  This  suggests  that these  companies  should  only approve  new 
projects which will make a positive return post-tax against a 7.5 to 8% discount rate. Given 
that  existing  refining  plant  in  Europe  is  on  average  about  20  years  old  (although  a 
proportion  of  units,  and  particularly  conversion  plants  have  been  built  within  the  last 
decade), achievement of these levels requires an average industry ROCE post-tax of, we 
estimate, about 11% to 12% just to maintain shareholder value. 
It has been  argued that since the investment is  sunk,  and  shareholder value has already 
been  destroyed,  existing  underperforming  assets  should  not  be  required  to  provide  a 
return  above  WACC.  This  is  uncommercial.  Loss-making  refineries,  with  no  prospect of 
returning to profitability, should indeed be written off according to international accounting 
standards,  but  there  are  few  such.  (This  is  discussed  further  in  section  4.2.5).  It  is 
however right for refiners to demand value from the remaining refineries which can give a 
positive, if still poor, return. 
Oil  companies  now  generally  set  themselves  targets  of  12  - 15%  return  on  capital 
employed for downstream refining and  marketing. This reflects the higher returns that are 
available  to  multinational  companies  from  alternative  investments  in  other  sectors.  As 
management targets these are appropriate.  If the average performer in  the industry is to 
avoid destroying shareholder value,  the pacesetters will  need  to  have significantly higher 
returns. 
Based on the above criteria our view is that 
The  refining  industry needs to  achieve a  level of profitability,  in  terms of 
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return on capital employed, of at least 10% and, to enhance shareholder
value, of 12% posf tax on existing assefs. An internal rate of return of
around B% is needed for new investments.
To achieve this ROCE of 10 - 12% the Brent Complex Margin would need to be around
$3.25 - 3.7slbbl (ECU 2.85 - 3.25 per barrel), compared with the average level of about
$2/bbl (ECU 1 .75 per barrel) over the last five years.
2.2.3 Re-investment economics
To invest in a typical refinery configuration for a balanced demand growth would require
Complex Margins in the range $3.30 to 3.90/bbl (ECU 2.90  3.40), assuming this
expansion took place within an existing site (brownfield construction), and taking an
internal rate of return of B%. Refining margins need to nearly double from existing levels to
justify such investment.
To build expansion capacity in a new, greenfield, site requires a Complex Margin of the
order of $S/bbl (ECU 4.35). While there are strong environmental, technical, and macro-
economic arguments to support at least some new refineries in Europe, probably linked to
the closure of several old sites, it is very clear that this type of project is not even being
remotely considered by the industry.
The gap between current margins and ROCE enjoyed by refiners, and the margins that
would be required for economic re-investment  are illustrated  in Figure 2-5.
(5)% to 0% ROCE
Figure 2-5  GRM achieved on current assets and required for new investment
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The  Leuna  refinery rebuild  in  Germany (completed  in  1997) is  an  exceptional  example, 
related to the needs and  rules of privatisation in the former East Germany, rather than to 
the  realities of the  refining  industry.  This  could  not have gone ahead  without substantial 
regional subsidies. 
2.3  MARKER MARGINS 
As  is well  known  in  the  industry,  confusion  can  arise when  "margins" are  quoted  unless 
great  care  is  taken  to  define  what  this  means.  For  example,  which  crude,  processed 
through  which  configuration,  to  which  products,  placed  in  which  market,  in  which  time 
frame,  and  whether this  is  a gross margin,  a net margin,  or an  operating  margin  either 
before or after tax. 
At the request of the Commission we have expanded on  this point in  the Appendix.  The 
margins  quoted  in  the  body  of this  report  all  refer  to  the  Rotterdam  Brent  Complex 
Refiners'  Gross  Margin,  using  the  International  Energy Agency  (lEA) definitions,  unless 
defined to the contrary. 
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2.4  DOES IT REALLY MATTER THAT REFINING INVESTMENT IS NOT VIABLE? 
The  increasing efficiency of international  oil  trading  markets  means  that the  oil  industry 
increasingly operates as a global commodity market. 
The  fierce  international  competition  that  this  engenders  means  that  consumers  benefit 
through low net-of-tax prices. Why should this situation be changed? Surely, the argument 
goes, oil companies are rich enough to carry poor refining results? 
2.4.1  Destroying shareholder value 
Integrated  oil  companies  have  certainly  continued  to  support  their  marketing  networks 
through their own refineries, despite their concerns about very low margins in refining. 
However,  many  oil  companies  have  been  increasingly  criticised  by  shareholders  for 
mediocre  profitability  results  overall,  and  a  spotlight  has  increasingly  been  put  on 
underperforming  sectors or regions - like  European  and  US  refining.  These sectors  are 
increasingly considered as destroyers of shareholder value. 
The European refining industry deploys some ECU 90 billion ($100 billion) capital at book 
value.  Uneconomic  performance  on  assets  of  this  scale  creates  a  misallocation  of 
resources in the economy. 
Efficient oil  trading  has also reduced  the  logic for vertical  integration in  the industry.  It is 
now much easier to  operate as  a wholly decoupled business,  concentrating for example 
only  on  the  upstream  sector,  or only  on  oil  marketing.  This  is  not  a message  which  is 
welcome  to  the  larger  oil  companies.  Nevertheless,  while  few  large  oil  marketing 
companies would  like to  risk having  no  refinery capacity at all to  support their marketing 
sales, many companies' results would improve if they had a significant refining deficit. The 
BP/Mobil  partnership  for  one  has  announced  an  aim  of covering  only  about  80%  of 
marketing needs through own refining capacity. 
In addition, a recent development in  Europe is that there are very few companies in which 
governments still have a shareholding.  The recently privatised oil  companies are already 
starting to act on more rigorous commercial rather than social interest grounds. 
2.4.2  Reluctance to invest 
At the more practical level,  low profitability leads to  a marked  reluctance to  invest.  Apart 
from  the  Leuna  refinery,  and  the wave  of cat  crackers  since  1980,  major oil  companies 
have not invested in  significant new capacity to improve their position in Western  Europe 
for some time. Investment to maintain the existing equipment is being carried out at a rate 
Page 12 Ill  -----------------------------·  ·------------------------------
of about  1.5%  of the  existing  asset  base  per  annum.  However,  rejuvenation  at  the 
required rate to avoid technical obsolescence is not taking place. 
The  industry  will  always  have  safety  as  a  key  objective.  Nonetheless  there  must  be 
questions  as  to  whether  some  of  the  smaller  players  are  tempted  to  run  at  higher 
operating risks than would  be deemed prudent.  Even  some of the major players,  despite 
assurances  to  the  contrary,  may  be  trimming  judgements  too  finely  as  budgets  come 
under the most intense pressure. 
2.4.3  Environmental investment needs 
The  environmental  debate  is  now a critical  matter for the  industry.  We  return  to this  in 
section 2.7.  However, as  profitability has failed  to  improve, the  oil  industry has,  in  parts, 
become very defensive.  Oil  companies are not likely to  respond  quickly and  positively to 
the prospect of another round of tighter standards which will involve very large investment 
costs, however much in tune they are with society's aims of protecting the environment. 
2.4.4  Global competitiveness 
With  investments focused  so  strongly on  minimum care  and  maintenance there must be 
serious concerns for the  long-term global competitiveness of the  industry. The European 
industry can  no  longer be  considered  as  acting  in  an  isolated  local  market.  The  refining 
industry  is  now  global,  and  IT  and  trading  capabilities  are  exposing  Europe  to  the  full 
intensity of that global commodity competition. 
Oil  companies are increasingly managing their assets as  a global  portfolio.  The  growing 
economies of South America  and  Asia  have  better long  term  profitability prospects than 
Europe  (despite  the  current  economic  downturn)  and  the  attractions  of  alternative 
investments  elsewhere  in  the  company's  portfolio,  for  instance  in  the  upstream,  will 
compete for available capital.  Major players now have explicit policies in  place to  reduce 
their exposure to Europe. 
In  addition to this  risk of 'delocalisation',  competing  refiners  based  in  the  Middle East or 
Eastern  Europe  have  the  potential  for investing  in  new technology in  large scale  plants 
that will provide a future competitive threat to ageing European refineries. 
2.4.5  The danger of continued structural decline 
If the present level of poor profitability persists, a few refinery closures will occur- but not 
enough  to  significantly  alter  margins.  Eventually  a  vicious  circle  will  set  in.  Lack  of 
strategic  new  investment  in  refining  will,  over  time,  put  the  European  Union  industry 
technically behind other expanding areas of the world  (Asia/Pacific, the Middle East,  and 
Eastern Europe), and could harm long-term global competitiveness. 
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As with other strategic sectors of industry that have gone into structural decline, putting off 
the necessary corrections now is likely to lead to a more painful enforced restructuring at a 
later date. 
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2.5  DEMAND IS RISING, BUT EXCESS CAPACITY WILL NOT DISAPPEAR 
2.5.1  Overall product imbalance in the European Union 
The conventional wisdom  is  that there is excess capacity in  European  refining,  and  that, 
by  stripping  out  the  surplus,  margins,  and  hence  profitability,  would  be  "better".  An 
alternative view that profitability  is  poor mainly  because  of imbalance  between  gasoline 
and diesel demand is discussed in 2.5.2 and 2.6.4 below. The two views are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Accepting the premise that tight capacity would  improve margins it becomes important to 
establish  whether and  when  the  surplus  capacity  might  be  absorbed  by  the  growth  in 
demand. 
Demand  is  ns1ng  and  the  call  on  distilling  capacity  will  rise  with  demand.  The 
Commission's  'European  Energy  to  2020'
1  report  is  a  major  piece  of work  to  define 
possible future worlds on  a consistent basis.  There are four scenarios.  These scenarios 
show a range of oil demand in  2010 between 612 and 645Mtpa, an  increase from 593Mt 
in  1996 (Figure 2-6). 
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Figure 2-6  EU refining capacity and oil consumption 
1 
1.5% capacity creep 
0.5% capacity creep 
Hypermarket} 
BF  Demand 
CW  forecasts 
Forum 
1 Definitions of the demand forecast scenarios Hypermarket, Battlefield (BF), Conventional Wisdom 
(CW}, and Forum can be found in the Commission's 'European Energy to 2020' report. 
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The  refinery  nameplate  distillation  capacity  in  1996  for  EU15  countries  was  645  Mtpa, 
using  official  lEA data.  However the  natural  process  of technical  learning,  found  in  all 
industries, will ensure that the actual capacity available to the industry will be greater. This 
capacity increase, largely from small  improvements to existing assets, is  known  in  the oil 
industry as "capacity creep". 
Misunderstandings can  arise on what factors cause capacity creep.  At the request of the 
Commission  we  have  therefore  given  a  more  detailed  explanation  in  the  Appendix. 
Because  of the  importance  of capacity  creep  in  assessing  forward  utilisation  we  have 
explored this in depth in all our interviews. 
There is a range of views  on  the rate of capacity growth due to capacity creep.  The  lEA 
feels that a range of between 0.5 and  0. 75% pa  is appropriate, and  bases this on  its own 
work and discussions with oil  companies at the technical level. Refinery engineering firms 
state that capacity creep is over 1.5% pa. As one of them said to us, "We should know, we 
are in the creep business!" 
Further,  as  new  investments  become  necessary  to  meet  environmental  standards  the 
opportunities  for  low  cost  debottlenecking  open  up.  Senior  executives  who  we  have 
interviewed put the likely range of capacity creep under these circumstances at the higher 
end. A range of between 1% pa and 2% pa,  on an overall EU basis, represents an almost 
universally held view. 
In  Figure 2-6 we show the wedge of capacity creep as  a range between 0.5% and  1.5% 
pa. 
A further point to note is that there is general agreement, including with the lEA, that some 
2-3% capacity needs to be added to the official lEA total nameplate capacity of 645 Mtpa 
in  1996  to  allow  for  capacity  creep  since  1990/91.  This  is  reflected  in  the  base  point 
capacity at 665Mtpa shown in Figure 2-6. 
The demand forecast can be compared with the capacity availability (Figure 
2-6).  It is clear that primary distillation capacity is likely to remain in surplus 
up to and beyond 2010. 
Several caveats require stating, although they do not change the overall conclusion. 
On  the one  hand,  the  Scenario demand  estimates have been  challenged  as  too low,  on 
the  basis  that  the  rate  of energy  efficiency  improvement  taken  is  too  high.  The  lEA, 
Concawe  and  others  subscribe  to  this  view.  However,  taking  the  higher  lEA  demand 
figures even with the  lEA's lower capacity creep assumptions leads to continuing surplus 
up to the year 2007. This gives no short-term relief to the refining industry. 
On the other hand, there is a powerful view that the oil demand projected in the Scenarios 
may still  be  high because in three of the four scenarios this would  lead  to an  increase in 
C02 emissions in Europe. There is no doubt that environmental pressures are building up, 
and  rising up the agendas of the public and  governments.  For example, this summer has 
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seen the banning of half the cars from the centres of Paris and Mexico City due to poor air 
quality. 
In addition, technical advances in  new "supercar'' developments by Mercedes and  others 
since the scenarios were written give hope for significant savings  in  transport fuel  use to 
become commercially viable towards the end of the next decade. 
Discussions, such as those in Kyoto in December, are likely to put downward pressure on 
the  consumption  of all  fossil  fuels  through  regulation  of use,  or through  new equipment 
standards.  We  note that the  Scenarios show global  C02 emissions essentially doubling 
from  1980  to  2020.  This  is  unlikely  to  be  acceptable  to  the  public  or  politicians. 
Increasingly visible congestion is also leading to a reduction of public tolerance of the rate 
of growth of private transport in a number of countries. 
A  third  caveat  is  that  as  yet  unannounced  closures  may  take  place.  One  closure  of 
150,000 bpcd  is 7.5 Mtpa.  It can  be seen from  Figure 2-6 that many such closures would 
be  required  to  close  the  probable  under-utilisation  gap  of some  70-1 OOm  tonnes  pa  of 
capacity. 
Overall there  is  a high  probability that there will  be  spare  refining  capacity well  into the 
next century unless the industry undertakes a major restructuring. 
2.5.2  Gasoline and Diesel imbalance 
All  the  above  refers  to  primary,  distillation  capacity.  However,  there  is  now  a  situation 
where the industry has some surplus secondary upgrading capacity. 
Over the  last  15  years  the  industry invested  heavily  in  catalytic cracking  capacity,  with 
capacity rising from 4% to  13% of total distillation capacity. The total conversion capacity 
of  all  units  expressed  in  terms  of  cat  cracking  equivalent  is  now  about  30%.  This 
conversion investment was driven by forecast assumptions of: 
•  higher gasoline demand 
•  a heavier crude barrel 
•  higher average sulphur in crude 
In  the  event,  none  of these  assumptions  were  realised.  Gasoline  is  now  in  decline  in 
Europe, and diesel demand continues to grow strongly, mainly due to tax incentives and a 
perception of environmental friendliness (Figure 2-7). 
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Figure 2-7  EU Gasoline and Diesel Demand 
The position in Southern Europe is different. Strong growth of gasoline continued to 1994. 
More modest growth of diesel  only  began  to  accelerate  in  1995.  Northern  Europe  (and 
particularly  France,  where  diesel  cars  form  almost  50%  of  new  passenger  car 
registrations) has experienced very fast diesel growth. 
For  refinery  upgrading  it  is  the  total  middle  distillates  demand  that  is  relevant.  In  both 
Northern  and  Southern  Europe  increasing  diesel  demand  has  been  partially  offset  by 
declining gasoil demand for heating. This trend is expected to continue with increasing use 
of natural gas. 
Forecasts of the forward  crude  mix indicate little change  in  the average sulphur content 
and a flat, perhaps marginal increase in heavy crude usage. 
The industry therefore now finds itself in the position of (Figure 2-8) 
•  Surplus gasoline capacity and net gasoline exports of 18 Mtpa and rising 
•  A gasoil and diesel balance which went into deficit of 9 million tonnes  in  1996 
because of a cold winter,  but which  is  broadly in  balance to slight deficit. This 
deficit is forecast to grow over the next 1  0 years. 
In  addition to the  surplus gasoline volume there has also been  a resultant decline in  the 
value  of  octane,  which  reduces  the  prices  achievable  for  higher  octane  qualities  of 
gasoline. 
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Figure 2-8  EU gasoline and gasoil/ diesel imports and exports 
The trend towards fast diesel growth was  initiated  by taxation differentials, as  almost all 
EU countries differentiated significantly in favour of diesel. However, technical advances in 
diesel  engines  and  other factors  have  changed  customer  perceptions,  and  there  is  no 
longer a direct correlation between demand and tax differentials, Figure 2-9. 
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Figure 2-9  Gasoline/diesel pump price differentials (1995) and demand growth 
The resultant gasoline surplus and diesel shortage is  not likely to be reversed in the short 
to medium term, even if tax policies in favour of diesel are reversed. 
The effect of the gasoline and diesel imbalance on  refining companies is discussed below 
in section 2.6.4. 
2.5.3  The effect of oil balances in other refining regions 
Eastern Europe and FSU 
There  is  currently  considerable  spare  capacity  in  this  region,  following  the  collapse  of 
these  countries'  economies.  The  Commission's  Scenarios  show an  increase  of exports 
from east Europe and the FSU,  rather than a deficit that could load EU15 spare capacity, 
(Figure 2-10). In assessing this probability consideration needs to be given to: 
•  the physical state of the spare capacity and whether it could  indeed  be  made 
available 
•  the extent to which part of this capacity will have to be shutdown permanently 
•  the requirements for local demand as the region's economy revives 
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•  the  availability  of  the  necessary  distribution  infrastructure  to  move  major 
volumes 
•  the ability of the area to produce the required EU product qualities 
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Figure 2-10  Eastern Europe/FSU oil product consumption, export and capacity 
We have explored these issues with the industry. There is a clear view that in  broad terms 
the  region  will  have  to  solve  its  own  problems  to  become  competitive.  This  may  be 
achieved fast in some countries through privatisation and  restructuring.  In  other countries 
the process may be slow and less efficient. 
In any event it is seen as most unlikely that there will be a major profitable export market 
here to even partly resolve the EU15 spare capacity problem. In the longer term there may 
well  be  increasing imports into the  EU  from this  region.  Accession  of applicant countries 
into the EU will if anything increase this trend. 
North/South America 
In  broad  terms  these  regions  are  moving  into  deficit,  with  the  higher  quality  CARS 
specification gasoline for California  being  particularly short.  Some European  refiners  are 
already supplying these markets and boosting their profitability. 
These niches may well continue, with product moving west as the arbitrage window opens 
for a time.  As volumes have increased  there are signs of nervousness in  the  industry at 
the  degree  of reliance  on  this  outlet,  with  a  freight  cost  of upwards  of ECU  1.1 0/bbl 
($1.25/bbl).  For high  quality material,  price  differentials offset the freight disadvantage -
but only a few European refiners can meet these stringent specifications. 
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On the other hand, as the lEA point out, the supply demand balance for the Atlantic Basin 
(Americas and Western Europe) is indicating the need for some 150-200,000 bpcd (about 
9 Mtpa) additional refining capacity each year between  1998 and  2002.  The lEA see the 
demand growth being primarily for middle distillates, jet fuel  and  diesel.  It is probable that 
the  industry in  the Americas will  respond  with  new capacity to  meet at least part of this 
demand. 
While strength in other areas of the Atlantic Basin may well help European refiners, we do 
not  consider  it  sound  policy  for  EU  refiners  to  plan  on  the  basis  of major  long  term 
structural exports for baseload qualities, which would  have the effect of setting European 
price levels at export parity. 
To  improve margins  EU  refiners  need  a deficit of capacity  in  Europe which would  move 
the margins closer to structural import parity. 
Middle East I Far East 
The last few years have seen the complex margins in the  Far East fall from ECU 3.50/bbl 
($4/bbl)  and  move  close  to  European  levels  of ECU  1. 75/bbl  ($2/bbl).  This  has  been 
caused by the economic downturn and industry overbuilding refining capacity, and is likely 
to worsen with the recent financial crisis in the region.  Demand growth is expected to take 
the industry back into deficit in the medium term.  Refinery new building is likely to broadly 
keep  pace with demand  in  the region.  However, short term overbuilding will  back surplus 
supplies from the highly competitive Middle East refineries into Europe or North America. 
Implications for Europe 
Supply and  demand developments in  other regions  of the world  are  not likely to  provide 
relief to the overcapacity in Europe over the medium to long term. 
EU refineries will need to be able to compete with potential imports from other regions, or 
with  other regions' exports when  EU  surpluses need  to  be  exported  to  markets such  as 
the  US.  To  do  this,  Europe  cannot  afford  to  have  cost  structures  and  processing 
efficiencies  too  far  below  global  pacesetters.  This  requires  adequate  investment  for 
rejuvenation and competitiveness. 
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An overview of the structural reasons is given below.
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2.6.1 Marginal pricing behaviour
The cost of processing a marginal barrel of crude oil is very low, perhaps only a few cents
per barrel above the cost of refinery fuel. In contrast, the fixed costs of a complex refinery
at capacity utilisation between 85% and 95% are in the region of ECU 1.55/bbl ($1.7slbbl).
This creates a powerful incentive to run the last barrel of crude, even if this only makes a
cash-contribution of a few cents. This whole marginal economic approach is driven by the
near-universal  use of linear programmes  (LPs) to maximise refinery operations, on an
annual, quarterly and monthly basis.
While most companies will limit the freedom of their traders to bid down the prices, this
whole process inexorably forces prices down to the point where 'cash costs' (fixed and
variable costs excluding depreciation and interest) are just covered. Contribution to capital
is rarely considered in day to day decision making - although managements regard it as
crucially important  for the future health and viability of their companies. As a result virtually
no companies achieve a reasonable  return on existing assets, and new investment cannot
be justified on a stand-alone basis.
This trend will continue unless industry behaviour  changes radically.
I
Allow continuance  of loss-making  refineries
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2.6.2  Cross subsidisation from vertical integration 
Amongst  integrated  oil  companies  there  is  cross-subsidisation  between  marketing  and 
refining.  Over 80%  of the  EU15  market  is  with  companies  whose  refining  is  vertically 
integrated with the upstream. The proportion covered by integrated refining and marketing 
exceeds 90%. 
It  is  clear  that  most  integrated  oil  companies  know  internally  the  profitability  of each 
segment with  reasonable accuracy from their management accounts. They endeavour to 
make an  acceptable return  on  capital from  each  segment,  and  share segment trends  in 
broad terms with the investment analyst community. 
In  addition,  most large  traditional  oil  companies  do  not consider it viable  to  retain  large 
marketing  networks  without  the  security  of being  able  to  supply  largely from  their own 
refining  capacity.  This  does  not however mean  that downstream  oil  companies  need  to 
have  full  refining  cover  for  100%  of their  sales,  as  the  BP/Mobil  joint-venture  and  a 
number of other companies demonstrate. 
Considering refining as a strategic component of the Downstream, or of the total corporate 
business, can  lead to unclear commercial signals and a lack of resolve to really tackle the 
problem  of  refining  under-performance.  This  is  particularly  true  where  a  company 
produces a good overall return to shareholders through high  returns from other business 
sectors. 
While there are strategic links between oil industry sectors, the reality is that independent 
markets already allow significant decoupling of refining  from  marketing.  Trading  markets 
for both crude oil and products have become increasingly efficient and liquid over the past 
two decades.  New competitors in  marketing - particularly the  hypermarkets - have found 
little difficulty in  getting product supplies on  the open  market in  most EU  countries.  They 
have found  it a competitive advantage  not to  have  to  support under-performing  refining 
assets. 
2.6.3  Obstacles and high cost of closure 
It is very clear from all our interviews that exit costs which are high relative to the potential 
cash  losses  of  underperforming  refineries  are  a  major  factor  hindering  necessary 
restructuring. 
The  closure  cost  of a refinery  has  two  main  components:  the  social  costs  of releasing 
staff, and the costs for the site clean-up. 
Estimates of the cost of closure vary quite widely, and will depend on social legislation and 
the  level of cleanup required.  For the purposes of this project we  estimate from  industry 
and  government sources  that  the  average  cost  of closure  is  in  the  order of ECU  100 
million, with  a range  between  ECU  50  and  ECU  200  million for individual refineries.  The 
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average cost typically consists of about ECU  60  million for clean-up costs,  and  ECU  40 
million for social costs. 
The industry takes seriously its social and environmental obligations, and there appears to 
be no dispute that when a refinery closes the refiner has a duty to compensate employees 
and assist their redeployment, and  also to clean up the land.  However, the clean-up cost 
raises concerns for two reasons: 
•  The absolute level of cost 
•  The uncertain and  open-ended exposure to future site environmental liabilities, 
which are virtually impossible to sell with the site. 
Open  ended  environmental  liabilities,  retroactively applied,  have given  rise  to  expensive 
settlements  in  the  US,  and  oil  companies  in  particular are wary of being  caught  in  the 
same situation  in  Europe.  Some companies  have  limited  this  risk internally by  retaining 
closed refineries as oil terminals. 
There is also reluctance by  some companies to take the write-down  in  their books of an 
asset that could be considered to be permanently impaired. This is somewhat ironic where 
the  alternative  is  a  low-priced  sale,  since  the  impact  on  the  accounts  is  the  same. 
Additionally, a sale is  likely to place a low cost asset base in the hands of an  aggressive 
competitor who will have much lower income requirements to reach  an  acceptable return 
on capital employed! 
Clearly, the refinery sale route is a poor choice for a company staying in the market. Only 
permanent closure will  lead  to any improvement of the existing refiner's own competitive 
position.  For a company leaving the  market a sale minimises the  cost of exit,  but it can 
also be used as a spoiling tactic against those remaining. 
The overall effect of all  of these factors  is  to  encourage the continuation of a number of 
poorly performing and loss-making refineries. 
2.6.4  Product imbalance between gasoline and diesel 
Section 2.5.2 above explains that the EU currently is surplus in catalytic cracking capacity 
and hence has surplus gasoline, but is balanced-to-deficit in diesel. 
The impact of this is that 
•  surplus gasoline is exported, incurring a freight penalty 
•  the value of high octane qualities is depressed 
•  diesel is imported, also incurring freight. 
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In  addition,  southern  Europe  refiners  (which  still  have  a  surplus  of gasoline  for  export 
despite fast demand growth to 1994) find it difficult to meet the tighter specifications of the 
US for gasoline. They are therefore forced to export surplus gasoline to  low value-added 
markets  like  Africa  in  strong  competition  with  both  Middle  East  and  South  American 
refiners. 
These  factors  reduce  the  margin  from  this  investment  in  conversion.  In  practice,  for 
European refiners,  the resultant depressing effect on  gasoline prices  is  only partly offset 
by pressure for diesel prices to rise. This is a significant contributor to low refining margins 
in Europe. 
However,  the  fact  that  hydroskimming  margins  still  do  not  cover cash  costs  in  Europe 
shows that it is the overall surplus of distillation capacity which is the main cause of poor 
returns on  capital employed.  Nevertheless, if distillation capacity is closed,  at least some 
conversion capacity should be closed too. Alternatively new hydrocracking capacity will be 
needed to rebalance the supply barrel. 
Bringing  the  demand  and  production  barrel  more  in  line  by  increasing  the  demand  for 
gasoline and  reducing  the  demand  for diesel  would  assist overall  profitability.  However, 
even with reversed taxation differentials, this would have little effect for many years given 
the percentage of diesel cars now in the car park. This is also politically sensitive because 
of the effect on trucking costs, and on the general public. 
Any move to  harmonise fuel  taxes within  the  Community would  have  to  be  seen  in  the 
context of proposals for the harmonisation of energy taxes overall. 
2.6.5  Product imports 
Adequate  returns  will  not  be  achieved  without  restructuring  to  remove  the  distillation 
capacity surplus. As supply for individual products becomes tight, price peaking will occur, 
driving up wholesale prices, and therefore margins. 
However, with  an  efficient global  market for bulk refined  products any temporarily higher 
margins in Europe will draw in imports. 
While the freight cost gives a measure of price protection there is  an  effective cap to the 
sustainable European margin while product is readily available elsewhere.  For substantial 
import volumes the most likely competitive supplying area to Europe is the Middle East. 
We  estimate the  relevant differential of product prices with  the  Middle  East to  be  about 
ECU 0.80/bbl ($0.90/bbl), which will become the effective average price cap for increases 
to North-West Europe margins - even for substantial volumes of product deficit in  Europe. 
This  is  equivalent to  about  0.005  ECU  per  litre  (half an  ECU  cent)  on  final  consumer 
prices. 
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However,  if gasoline  moved  from  structural  export  parity,  to  structural  import  parity,  a 
larger margin improvement can be expected for the base load gasoline production. 
Because  of increasingly  sophisticated  trading,  the  point  at  which  prices  start  to  rise 
significantly has over the past decade moved  much  closer to full  capacity utilisation. This 
in  turn  limits  the  benefits  from  an  individual  closure.  At  present  utilisations  several 
refineries have to close before an appreciable effect on margins will occur. 
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2.7  ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS INCREASE THE BURDEN ON EU REFINING 
The  European  Council's  'common  position'  of June  1997  proposed  more  stringent fuel 
specifications for the year 2000, and  indicative targets for 2005. These specifications are 
subject to further conciliation between the Commission and the European Parliament. 
The industry recognises an  obligation to play its part in discussions and action to improve 
the  environment in  Europe,  to  the  benefit of the  whole  community.  However,  there  are 
important concerns which the industry has on several aspects of the current position. 
2.7.1  Investments required and profitability 
The  oil  industry estimates  that  on  top  of a 20  billion  ECU  cost  to  meet the  year 2000 
standards,  it  would  cost  about  a further 25  billion  ECU  to  implement the  2005  targets 
proposed by the Council. 
Even if the forecasts costs are overstated, this will be a huge cost for an underperforming 
industry to bear. As argued above, the oil industry pricing mechanisms will not normally be 
able to recover additional investment costs. 
The probability of the industry being able to achieve, and then to maintain, an acceptable 
additional margin in the market to cover these investments is remote. 
The  Auto-oil  process  has  not  sufficiently  discussed  how  environmental  costs  will  be 
recovered.  There  may  be  an  imbalance  between  the  oil  industry  and  the  automotive 
industry  in  this  respect.  A  majority of the  costs  to  meet  air quality  objectives  for 2005 
through fuel specifications are borne by capital investment. As shown above, the marginal 
pricing  mechanism  in  refining  will  not  in  current  circumstances  reflect  this  in  consumer 
prices.  If very high  costs are placed  on  refining  to  meet fuel  specifications the  effect will 
vary: 
•  Some  will  invest,  and  accept  the  unprofitable  'investment'  as  the  price  of 
continuing to do business in Europe. 
•  Some will rebalance output and decide not to supply part of the overall gasoline 
and distillate demand 
•  Many will add  low cost incremental capacity (capacity creep) to achieve some 
incremental revenue from the investment. 
•  Some will decide not to supply the higher specification products 
•  Others will consider exit very seriously, some can be expected to close 
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In  section  2.6  above  we  have  argued  that  distillation  capacity  needs  to  close.  To  this 
extent it could  be argued that by forcing closure the high environmental investment costs 
will  help  the  industry.  This  is  only  true  if  enough  refineries  are  forced  to  close  to 
significantly  raise  margins.  We  do  not  think  this  will  happen  without  substantial  other 
measures. 
2.7.2  The polluter pays principle 
In the case of transport fuels,  consumers, who through their governments have made the 
choice  for more  stringent specifications,  should  bear the  cost.  This  principle  is  already 
accepted  by  the Commission.  The  refiner should  not bear the  cost without an  accepted 
means of recovery. 
New specifications could be introduced on a mandatory basis from a defined date. A more 
attractive alternative, which phases changes in over a period, is by tax differentiation. The 
advantages include: 
•  stimulates quality competition and consumer awareness 
•  the consumer makes the choice between "cleaner'' and "dirtier'' fuels 
•  a  tax  benefit  partly  flows  through  to  the  refiner,  to  provide  an  appropriate 
return, as  in the Swedish city diesel case, or as in the introduction of unleaded 
gasoline 
•  allows for a progressive phasing of investment to meet higher targets 
•  stimulates the rejuvenation of the refining industry 
Achieved  quality levels through  the  tax  differentiation  mechanism  can  then  be  changed 
into  mandatory legislation  at a later date.  The  fiscal  instrument,  followed  by  mandatory 
legislation, then become a powerful complementary combination. 
Tax  differentiation  at appropriate  levels  would  also  provide  a  mechanism  for  smoother 
phasing-in of new specifications.  However,  the  benefit to  refiners  of tax-differentiation  is 
temporary rather than structural, as the competitive process will erode away gains once a 
substantial majority of consumers have switched to the new fuel. 
2. 7.3  Process and cost effectiveness of alternative solutions 
There are serious concerns about the process that resulted  in  the  2005 indicative target 
specifications becoming possible, even likely. 
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It is entirely appropriate that the desired overall air quality standards are set at the political 
level.  However, the  choice of standard should  be  made  in  full  awareness of the  costs to 
the whole of the European Community, and  on  Community competitiveness globally. This 
was the guiding principle behind the Auto Oil programme. 
However,  in  the  view  of  the  refining  industry  the  discussion  of  the  specifications 
recommended as  a result of the  Auto Oil  1 programme has  become disconnected from 
the  original agreed  objectives.  A second Auto Oil  programme will  now evaluate the  cost 
effectiveness of measures under discussion for 2005. The Commission, governments, the 
European  Parliament  and  the  oil  and  automotive  industries  need  to  ensure  that  the 
subsequent discussion of new fuel specifications takes all interests fairly into account. 
2. 7.4  2005 Specification levels 
Whilst  improved  environmental  standards  are  clearly  a  necessity,  those  specifications 
which  are  particularly costly on  technical  refining  grounds  but only lead  to  relatively  low 
marginal environmental gain, should be re-examined. These may include: 
•  Gasoline aromatics to 35% 
•  Diesel sulphur to 50ppm or lower 
•  Other light city diesel specs 
The biggest single investment cost estimated for the 2005 indicative targets is the move in 
road  diesel  from  350ppm
2  sulphur  to  50  ppm  sulphur  in  2005.  The  argument  for  this 
specification  is  that  current  catalyst  technology  for  removing  emissions  from  diesel 
exhaust requires a maximum 50ppm of sulphur to  prevent catalyst contamination.  There 
has  not  been  extensive  research  on  the  effect  of  intermediate  levels  of sulphur  (for 
instance 150ppm) on  current catalysts,  nor on  new catalyst technologies which  could  be 
available by 2005. This and other issues need to be critically re-examined by Auto Oil 2. 
It should be noted that solutions which are feasible on a single nation basis might well lead 
to  abnormal  results  on  an  EU  wide  basis.  For  example,  light  city  diesel  at  Swedish 
specifications,  largely met  by  changing  crudes  and  importing  deficits  in  Sweden's  case, 
would probably lead to a shortage of jet fuel and kerosene if applied on a mandatory basis 
throughout the EU. 
2 Proposed by the European Commission for 2000 
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2.7.5  Refinery emissions 
In  all  of the foregoing we  are referring to the specifications for transport fuels.  There are 
obligations  on  the  refineries  to  meet  environmental  emission  standards  for  SOx,  NOx, 
water,  noise and  particulates,  in  particular. We  note that the  implications of the  LCP and 
IPPC Directives for refiners could  be  significant, especially as  IPPC directives are based 
on best available technology (BAT) and therefore represent a particularly costly scheme. 
While  we  would  argue  that  the  same  principles  of rigorous  cost  effectiveness  analysis 
should  apply,  refinery emissions have  not been  a part of this  study.  We  have  assumed 
that refineries continue to be responsible for funding agreed standards on emissions from 
refineries. 
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2.8  OIL COMPANIES ARE MAKING SOME STRATEGIC CHANGES BUT NOT YET ENOUGH 
2.8.1  Convergent strategies 
There  is  a  universal  and  powerful  drive  by  the  refining  industry  to  improve 
competitiveness.  Benchmarking  plays  a major role  in  identifying weaknesses  and  areas 
for attention. The actions focus on three main areas: 
Improving  revenue:  The  industry  strives  to  find  profitable  new  product  outlets  and  to 
broaden  its  revenue  base.  There  are some  revenue  niches such  as  district heating,  co-
generation, access to  infrastructure, ability to supply CARB gasoline or needle-coke,  but 
with  oil  products traded  at the  refinery gate as  near-commodities the  scope for revenue 
enhancement in refining is limited. 
Reducing costs:  Manpower levels are under continuous scrutiny, including management 
structures,  amalgamating  operations,  savings  in  support  activities,  improving  IT 
capabilities and streamlining research. 
Improving  efficiency:  Process  technology  and  innovation  in  catalysts  continue  to 
advance.  Maintenance  and  inspection  techniques  allow  ever-shorter  shutdown  times, 
extend  the  period  between  shutdowns,  and  minimise  unscheduled  outages.  Operating 
techniques and economics and scheduling activities allow more value to be extracted from 
each  barrel.  There are  substantial improvements from  IT and  advanced  process  control 
systems. 
The refining industry devotes enormous energy to all of the above. The problem is that the 
gains  are  competed  away  as  fast  as  they  are  made,  to  the  benefit of consumers.  The 
industry is left no more profitable than before: in effect it is running fast to stand still. 
Industry steps towards divergent strategies and  restructuring, which have the potential to 
alter the competitive scene, therefore need to be encouraged. 
2.8.2  Divergent strategies 
The merger of BP and Mobil's downstream activities across Europe is the most significant 
development  announced  to  date.  This  creates  an  entity  roughly  as  large  as  Shell  or 
Exxon, with these three holding about half of the European market together. 
The  merger of OMW and  Exxon's  refining  interests  in  the  Karlsruhe  is  an  example of a 
local  Joint Venture  approach  to  rationalising  capacity,  reducing  costs  and  giving  some 
support to margins. The capacity involved is, however, small, only 16 Mtpa or 2.5% of the 
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European  Union  total.  Unlike  the  upstream  oil  industry,  joint  ventures  are  not  yet  a 
significant feature in European refining. 
Discussions over the past year to resolve the overcapacity in south-east France appear to 
have achieved little.  In  Wales,  a merger was  agreed  between  Elf,  Murco and  Gulf - but 
this fell through. Gulf subsequently decided to close its Milford Haven refinery. 
This  demonstrates  that  there  are  many  obstacles  to  restructuring.  One  of these  is  the 
difficulty and costs of disposing of or selling poor-performing refineries. For instance, in the 
BP/Mobil merger, BP's Lavera refinery in S.E.  France and Nerefco in Pernis, Holland were 
obstacles to a deal and were left out of the merger, as was Mobil's share in  the Neustad 
refinery in Germany. 
There  is  still  much  intense and  commercially  sensitive confidential  discussion  going  on, 
some of it publicly announced -such as  the  declared readiness of both  Elf and  Total to 
seek  suitable  alliances.  However  progress  is  slow,  and  it  could  be  concluded  that  the 
traditional  refiners  are  currently locked  into an  uneasy transition,  with  as  yet insufficient 
impetus to effective restructuring. 
There are two classes of players who have the potential capability to make significant new 
impact. 
Firstly, the independent traders who could  buy European refineries cheaply, as TOSCO 
have  bought  the  old  Exxon  Bayway  refinery  and  others  in  the  USA.  Beta  refinery  in 
Wilhelmshaven is a similar example in Europe. A refinery in these hands becomes a major 
force in that: 
•  There  is  ruthless  cost cutting  and  a drive to  move  maximum volume through 
aggressive trading, putting further pressure on margins 
•  As  the  asset  will  have  been  purchased  at  'distress'  prices  the  book  value 
capital  employed  will  be  low.  The  operator  can  tolerate  a  much  lower  Net 
Income After Tax can  be  tolerated  while  still  making  an  adequate  Return  On 
Capital Employed. 
Secondly,  the  upstream  producer  companies,  European  State-owned  producers,  or 
more  particularly OPEC,  are  looking  for secure  outlets  for their crude.  They  may  have 
different financial  criteria.  They  have  an  incentive to  cross-subsidise  from  the  upstream 
just as  the  oil  majors  did  up  to  the  early  1970s,  when  they owned  substantially all  the 
crude  oil.  These  companies  could  control  the  ultimate  European  end-game should  they 
choose  to  do  so.  To  date  these  companies  have  mostly  adopted  a  fully  commercial 
approach to their European downstream interests. 
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2.9 FON SECURITY OF SUPPLY CRUDE OIL AVAILABILITY IS THE CRITICAL FACTOR
Continuous supply of oil products is vital to the EU. A very large deficit of refining capacity
in the EU as a whole would put supply at risk, but such an outcome is not under
consideration in this study, and will not occur for the foreseeable future.
The issue is whether security of supply is at risk when refinery capacity is in a small deficit.
ln supply disruption circumstances it is access to supply of crude and feedstocks,  rather
than specifically the location or capacity of refineries that is critical for security of supply.
An appropriate policy for strategic stock levels is also critical, as is access to and flexibility
of distribution infrastructure.(Figure 2-1 1).
Premise lmpact of supply disruption
Crude availability  down
30%
Refining capacity  in EU
for normal demand
Product availability  constrained  by crude
Substantial spare refining capacity  in EU
Product price hike inevitable
Crude availability  down
30o/o
Refining capacity  in EU
well below normal
demand
Product availability constrained  by crude
Probability of spare refining capacity in EU
Spare global refining capacity  for rent to those with access
to crude
Crude availability at
normal
Refinery capacity  below
EU normal demand
. Disruptions  (e.9. refinery or pipeline accident,  shipping
outage) should be covered  by compulsory  stocks and imports,
but with some price increase
Figure 2-11 lmpact of supply disruption on EU security of supply
We have explored this hypothesis with care in our interviews. The industry, refiners and
independent  traders, all hold similar views.
We explored the level of refining cover felt appropriate in a supply disruption. Views
varied between 60-90% of the normal call on refining. This is well below current refining
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capacity in the EU. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and  Ireland all operate well with a 
deficit in  refining capacity.  In  particular,  Germany and  Ireland  have  large deficits of 75% 
and  53%  cover  respectively.  While  the  percentage  can  be  debated  there  is  a  clear 
consensus that it is access to crude, products and infrastructure that is most important. 
If there  is  a severe crude  shortage then  those with  crude will  find  no  difficulty in  renting 
spare refining  capacity globally to  refine that crude,  provided they can  also transport the 
crude and products. 
In these discussions two other aspects came out: 
There  is  a  need  to  keep  an  appropriate  level  of strategic  stock  of oil  products  to 
cushion  the  initial  disruption  caused  by  any  crisis.  The  current  90  days  level  seems 
satisfactory,  provided the stock indeed  exists.  A lower level of stock may be  appropriate 
for net exporters.  There were several  in  the  industry who  commented  that governments 
are not yet seeing the issue on a pan-European basis, and that the mechanisms and stock 
levels for strategic stock management are in need of some revision. 
Access to, and flexibility of infrastructure is important, whether this is pipelines, road,  rail, 
shipping  or  depots.  One  government  stressed  that  supply  security  needed  to  be 
considered  at several  levels,  the  European  and  country  level  certainly,  but  also  within 
countries.  Depending  on  geography  and  infrastructure,  major  pockets  of  particular 
exposure could occur. These considerations also become important when industrial unrest 
hinders  supply  movements.  Recent  strikes  in  France  showed  that  it  is  the  logistics  of 
where  stocks  are  held  and  how  they  are  moved  that  are  critical,  rather  than  where 
products are actually refined. 
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2.1 0  EMPLOYMENT IN EU REFINING IS SMALL RELATIVE TO OTHER STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 
Employment, and particularly the level of unemployment, is a serious and growing concern 
to governments and to the public alike. 
The refining sector in Europe has been reducing manpower over many years. The days of 
thousands of employees at a single refinery are long past in the EU. These changes have 
been  absorbed  by  society  and  the  process  will  undoubtedly  continue.  In  addition  to 
employment related to normal refining operations, the level of refinery investment has an 
impact  on  employment  for  engineering  and  heavy  manufacturing  industries.  About  a 
quarter of EU refineries have associated petrochemical plants. 
The numbers directly employed in EU15 refineries are now put at about 90,000, including 
both own staff and contractors. As is clear from  Figure 2-12,  this is a low number relative 
to other strategic industries. 
EU direct 
employment 
(1995) 
90,000 
Refining 
industry 
450 000 
Iron & steel 
industry 
Figure 2-12  Employment in selected EU industries 
1,600,000 
Automotive 
industry 
In  addition to direct employment there are others whose employment depends to varying 
degrees on  the  presence of a refinery.  We  estimate that this indirect employment has a 
multiplier of up to 4. There are a small number of cases where a small local community is 
over-dependent upon  employment by  a particular refinery.  This  is  exceptional  and  may 
also  be  a  strategically  undesirable  risk  for the  community.  In  these  cases  government 
policies for redeployment and  broadening  the  skills and  employment base  should  come 
into play to enable refining restructuring if necessary. 
The oil  companies generally have  an  excellent record  of shedding staff in  a responsible 
way.  Even  on  the hypothesis of 10%  cut in  capacity the  direct numbers  released  on  an 
average  basis  would  be  no  more  than  9,000,  realistically  spread  over a few  years.  By 
comparison with the announcements being made by other industries this is very low. 
Page 36 II  ---------------------------- ~----------------------------
We are therefore of the view that redeployment of staff when refineries shutdown is not a 
crucial factor that should stand in the way of restructuring. 
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2.11  ANY SOLUTION NEEDS TO TAKE COMPETITION CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT 
2.11.1  Strategic considerations 
The refining industry is among the world's most competitive industries. This is contributed 
to  by  transparency  from  published  data  as  in  Platts,  sophisticated  trading  capabilities 
backed  by  ever  more  powerful  computers,  global  arbitrage,  a  competitive  mindset, 
concern over image, and public scrutiny. 
A particularly potent force for competition is the very real, and entirely valid, concern in the 
industry not to do anything that might be considered to be anti-trust or against Article 85 of 
the Treaty of Rome. 
We  have  formed  the  view  that  these  very  proper  concerns  about  anti-competitive 
behaviour  are  now  getting  in  the  way  of essential  restructuring,  and  that  necessary 
dialogue  to  enable  restructuring  is  prevented  from  taking  place  by  fears  of  risking 
breaching competition law. 
As one senior executive put it, 
"Governments,  the  Commission  and  industry  need  to  agree  what  is 
acceptable and then let industry make the decisions that it needs to make." 
Further,  we  note  (Community Competition  Policy  in  1993,  Commissioner van  Miert) that 
the Commission's policy recognises this: 
"But  if  creating  such  entities  (firms  grouping  together)  is  the  only  way  of 
withstanding  extremely  keen  competition  on  international  markets  in  high-tech 
sectors,  why should firms not be permitted to  enter into such alliances,  subject to 
certain conditions?" 
We return to these aspects later, in our recommendations. 
2.11.2  Possible closure fund 
There  are  two  key  aspects  here.  Firstly,  whether  or  not  a  closure  fund  could  be 
established under the Community's Competition law.  Secondly, whether it may be funded 
by State aid. Again we note Commissioner Van Miert's comments. 
"In  return  for  its  approval,  the  Community  requires  substantial  cutbacks  in 
production capacity in order to help put the industry back onto a sound footing. " 
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"Firms  may need  to  be  drastically  restructured  in  order to  adjust  to  economic 
conditions,  but if they do so with State aid it must be granted once and for all and 
used  to  carry  out  genuine  restructuring  that  is  beneficial  to  the  whole  of the 
industry concerned." 
In  our  view  this  gives  firm  support  to  the  principle  of  some  form  of closure  fund  to 
restructure the refining industry. However, state aid for such a fund, either on a regional or 
community-wide basis, is unacceptable. Therefore such a fund would need to be financed 
by the refining industry itself. 
2.11.3  Hidden subsidies and exit barriers 
By the very nature of these it is difficult to find clear formal evidence what exactly is going 
on.  Equally,  there is  sufficient anecdotal and  confidential opinion  to  say that prima facie 
these elements exist and  that they do  influence  closure  decisions in  one  country to the 
detriment of other countries,  and  of sensible,  market-led  restructuring  of the  oil  refining 
industry. We quote examples of the types of measures which exist in the Appendix. 
Quoting again from Commissioner van Miert: 
"Only  the  Commission,  an  independent  body  acting  in  the  interests  of the 
Community as  a  whole,  can  guarantee  that common  rules  are  applied  without 
national bias." 
"Its first task is therefore to ensure that everyone plays the game fairly,  by putting 
an  end to  any behaviour that could harm  the  interests of other firms  or ordinary 
people." 
"It must intervene,  however,  when  competition is  threatened by state aid,  cartels, 
mergers or any other form of  co-operation." 
These  statements  have  wide  application  to  any  merger or multi-company joint venture 
discussions required to enable the industry to restructure. They would also seem to define 
an obligation on the Commission to try to identify and to remove hidden subsidies and exit 
barriers that are not totally even-handed across the Community. 
There  could  be  a  role  here  for  EuroPIA,  to  document the  facts  as  a  basis  for  further 
consideration and action. 
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3.  RESULTS  OF  INTERVIEWS  WITH  THE  INDUSTRY  AND 
GOVERNMENTS 
3.1  APPROACH AND SCOPE 
We  conducted  interviews  with  twenty-one  oil  companies,  seven  other  oil  industry 
organisations,  and  eight governments,  generally at Chief Executive  or equivalent  level. 
Further input was sought from other governments through a structured questionnaire. 
Almost without exception, the organisations approached responded most positively. 
The  nature  of the  interviews  was  open,  interactive  and  remarkably  frank.  For the  first 
round  we used  a structured  discussion template  (see Appendix)  as  a  basis  so  that we 
could  more readily consolidate the  inputs.  As  the  project progressed we enhanced  this 
structure to include a wide range of possible action ideas. 
We are most grateful to all those who gave of their time and views so generously. 
3.2  VIEWS OF INDUSTRY, INDUSTRY BODIES AND GOVERNMENTS 
3.2.1  Oil company interviews 
Profitability 
It will  be  no surprise that there was wide  agreement that the  profitability of the  refining 
industry is inadequate, and has been so for a long time. 
The sharp focus  on  segmented  ROCE was not prevalent in  the  1960s and  1970s.  Nor 
were there really separate markets to allow it to be calculated. A case can be made that 
the  profitability  has  been  low  for  decades,  but  that  it  is  only  in  the  1980s,  and  most 
certainly in the 1990s, that the issue has come into sharp focus. 
There was a clear consensus that the  (after tax) profitability has been of the order 
of  2% to 6% ROCE over the last five years or so. 
This is  not the full  range,  more an  assessment of where some form of weighted average 
might lie. Input from investment analyst companies supports this range. 
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It is clear that there are some companies who have negative or very low ROCEs, perhaps 
of the order of -5% to plus 2%. 
Equally there are a very few who are achieving  15%  or even  better from  a niche,  either 
geographic or product, and normally linked to choice of technology and market. 
Only in a small number of cases were we left uncertain as to whether or not the company 
had assessed their refining profitability with appropriate methodologies. For the majority it 
was clear that they knew their own position in detail, both by refinery and  by total refining 
and marketing sectors, and that of the industry overall from their competitor studies. 
Substantial  excess  European  refining  capacity  was  widely  agreed  as  being  the  major 
cause,  with  a  consensus  that  some  10%  or  more  excess  capacity  existed.  The  most 
common  view  was  that  5-15  refineries  should  go.  Some  companies  suggested 
Commission guidelines to identify closure candidates. 
Roland Berger &  Partner  comment:  We  accept  that profitability has  been  low.  The 
industry  expects  governments  to  provide  support  and  frameworks  for  refinery 
restructuring.  However,  industry has failed to make the case to  the general public and to 
governments.  The  industry has to  make  up  its  mind whether it is going  to  publicise  its 
internally  available  data  on  European  refining  profitability,  the  strategic  importance  of 
refining  and the  case  for (non-financial)  support,  or to  accept that this  support has not 
been earned. 
We believe that the industry is highly strategic up to say 80% of market demand and that 
its failure  would dramatically effect the economies of Europe as the supplier of transport 
fuels for industry in particular. 
Perceptions of industry behaviour 
There is no doubting that the industry sees itself as its own worst enemy. Marginal pricing 
behaviour drives prices and returns down. Near universal use of Linear Programming tools 
exacerbate this trend.  Short term gains are competed away.  If one company attempts to 
signal a preferred higher price, or cuts production in an attempt to support margins, others 
do not follow but rush in to grab market share. 
As one senior executive put it: 
"Refiners are the most stupid players in  the oil industry,  and are likely to  continue 
to adopt self-defeating strategies." 
Companies  see  no  clear  way  out,  although  some  have  bitten  the  bullet  and  closed 
capacity,  or merged.  Many  companies  favour joint ventures  and  alliances  in  principle. 
However there is serious concern about the response of competition authorities. 
There was universal agreement that "things can't go on" and "something has to happen." 
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Roland Berger & Partner comment:  The  structural forces acting on  the industry make 
such behaviour almost inevitable. However,  it is remarkable that the industry is seemingly 
unable  to  respond to  the  challenge  of setting production levels and prices which  would 
give a fair return on the substantial assets deployed. 
Integration 
There were widely felt to  be  strategic links  between  refining  and  marketing  in  particular, 
also in  some cases between refining and  upstream, and  in  a few cases between refining 
and chemicals if on the same site. 
On  the  other  hand  there  was  some  acceptance  that  synergies  have  reduced  and  a 
general acceptance that a 1:1  cover of marketing by refining capacity was not required. A 
figure of 80%  was  mentioned  more than  once,  with  some  companies  having  an  explicit 
strategy to get their European refining capacity down to this level, or below. 
Roland  Berger  &  Partner  comment:  We  agree  the  concept  of refining  capacity  to 
support marketing networks. We do not see the need for that level to be at the 1:1 level. 
Why is the problem not self correcting? 
The very high  cost of closure  is  seen  as  the  primary reason.  Estimates of this cost vary 
between  $50  and  200  million  per  refinery,  obviously  highly  dependent  on  the  site  and 
required clean up standard. 
Provided  cash  cost  are  being  covered  the  decision  to  close  is  difficult.  As  one  Chief 
Executive said: 
"If I can earn $1 next year why should I spend $100 million to close?" 
We  heard  many such comments.  In  addition,  the perceived  unlimited liability to  clean-up 
costs,  even  after a site  is  cleaned  and  sold,  weighs  heavily  on  several,  who  draw the 
analogy with  this  position  in  America.  There was  strong  support for lowering  exit  costs, 
including harmonised standards for remediation. 
Poor refining  results  are  being  cross-subsidised  from  other oil  sectors,  or indeed  other 
businesses.  Asked  why  this  is  acceptable  the  response  tended  to  be  that  this  was  a 
management decision, and that management had  both the necessary information and the 
right to make this decision. 
However, some companies are diverting investments to other areas where the profitability 
prospects are seen as better. Some companies have an explicit policy in place to manage 
their downstream business on this basis and to reduce substantially their exposure to the 
prospects of ongoing inadequate European refining margins, a process also referred to as 
delocalisation. 
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The refining industry is one of the globally most transparent and most fiercely competitive. 
It is therefore surprising to hear the real concern expressed by many about the reaction of 
the competition authorities to multi-party discussions in particular. While the stance of the 
American  companies  in  particular  can  be  understood,  these  concerns  appear 
exaggerated. 
As one senior (non-American company) executive put it: 
"The  government,  with  the  industry,  should  set  the  framework,  define  what  is 
acceptable, and then get the hell out of the way to let the industry get on with what 
the industry needs to do." 
Roland Berger &  Partner comment:  We  agree  that there  is  scope  for harmonisation, 
and possible capping of  environmental liabilities, 
The possible response of the competition authorities is genuinely felt and is getting in  the 
way.  We  are recommending a top level exchange of views between the  Commission and 
the industry in which a new publicly defensible understanding can be found between these 
authorities and the industry. 
Closure fund 
There  were  divergent  views  on  a  closure  fund.  Many  companies  were  ambivalent  or 
against an  industry fund.  Some were  supportive,  seeing  that "reducing  the  exit costs  to 
zero" is a win-win-win situation for governments, leavers and stayers. 
There was near universal agreement that any such fund should be industry funded. 
Roland Berger & Partner comment: We  find it surprising that there is not more serious 
consideration by the industry of the once-off closure cost (funded by industry) versus the 
much  larger,  and ongoing,  margin  improvement  that  would  accrue  to  all if sufficient 
capacity  is  closed.  We  do  accept  the  concerns  that  at  the  present  overcapacity  an 
individual closure  does  not bring a  significant margin  improvement,  which  may be  the 
reason for some companies' lack of  support. 
Shareholder pressure 
We  found  that shareholder pressure to  perform appears not to  be  a major concern.  The 
general  view  was  that  shareholders  tend  to  judge  overall  performance  rather  than 
particular areas. However, some companies feel that the pressure will increase. 
Asked whether disclosure of separate refining ROCE would assist there was ambivalence. 
This was seen by many,  but not all, as a threat.  Some companies felt this to be  powerful 
and that universal rules would be acceptable. 
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One Chief Executive, after considering, took a clear stance that: 
"Yes  it would  help,  provided  we  all  had  to  do  it.  But,  it  would  bring  the  financial 
community down on our necks" 
Roland Berger & Partner comment:  We  agree with  this Chief Executive.  Disclosure of 
the (internally well known)  after-tax company refining profitability in  Europe might be the 
single largest spur to improvement; to the benefit of  both the industry and the Community. 
Security of supply 
There was wide  agreement that there  could  be  substantial  closures without security of 
supply becoming an issue.  In a supply crisis access to hydrocarbons, crude and products 
is  seen as key.  In  a crisis there will  be  refining  capacity to rent.  Having capacity and  no 
crude oil to process does not provide security. 
Most companies also emphasised the importance of compulsory stocks to allow time for 
appropriate crisis responses to be  put in  place.  However, a minority felt that with a lower 
overall  supply risk  in  the  markets,  compared  with  a decade ago,  90  days was  now too 
high. 
Many  also  emphasised  the  need  for  access  to  distribution  infrastructure  as  of  great 
importance in  a crisis.  A few commented that the  existing arrangements for compulsory 
stocks were in need of review and update. 
Roland Berger & Partner comment:.  Compulsory stocks, their level and their working,  is 
outside the  scope  of this  report.  However,  there  seems  to  be  a prima-facie case  for a 
thorough-going fundamental review. 
We think it is of  critical strategic importance that Europe has adequate refining capacity for 
both cost-efficiency and strategic reasons.  We  do not believe that this need is anywhere 
near the  level of 100%  cover for marketing.  We  see  a  preferred level emerging  from 
further dialogue and actions, but would be surprised if  this were higher than 85% cover. 
Environmental standards 
There  was  a  universal  and  strong  view  that  the  indicative  proposal  for  2005  is  too 
stringent, and not justified on cost effectiveness grounds. There was a small minority view 
in support of tougher standards as a way of forcing restructuring. 
There was a recognition by some that the industry lost credibility by announcing too high 
investment needs for 2000. 
The rational cost effectiveness approach adopted for Auto-Oil 1 found universal support as 
the way to reach the right balance for the Community as a whole. 
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Many  commented  that  the  low  profitability,  and  the  political  over-ride  of  a  rational 
approach, had led to a defensive attitude on the part of the industry. The credibility of the 
current position came in for widespread criticism. 
These circumstances have led to changes in attitudes. Some companies said that they no 
longer  felt  obliged  to  cover  all  of  the  product  market,  or  all  of  a  country.  Limiting 
investment, withdrawing from some market segments or withdrawing more widely are now 
seen as viable options by players who previously would not have taken this stance. 
Roland Berger & Partner comment: The  industry did itself a disservice by quoting too 
high costs in the past. They should adopt stringent defensible levels in the future. 
Notwithstanding that,  we  are strongly of the  view,  that once air quality standards are set 
by politicians then the auto and oil industries should adopt rigorous cost-effective analysis 
on ways to meet these levels.  This seems to us to represent the best process and the one 
most likely to achieve a fair sharing of  the costs of  meeting environmental targets. 
Diesel 
The imbalance between gasoline and diesel is widely seen as having been caused by tax 
distortions.  Many  forceful  comments  were  made  that  the  tax  differentials  should  be 
removed, and that this is in line with Community policy. 
There were,  however,  mixed  views  on  the  ability of the  industry to  handle  the  position. 
This depended on individual positions to place surplus gasoline at attractive prices, and on 
the ability to meet increased diesel demand at the possible higher specifications. 
There was a wide expectation that the issue would impact both profitability and investment 
need, although differing views on the extent. 
Italy is the exception, with surplus diesel. 
Roland Berger & Partner comment:  We  accept that large tax differentials initiated the 
dieselisation trend and a skewed demand barrel follows.  This  requires a higher level of 
investment  than  a  more  balanced  barrel,  placing  European  refining  at a  competitive 
disadvantage. However, there is no longer a direct relationship between the tax differential 
and diesel demand.  Even if tax differentials are removed it will take many years for diesel 
and gasoline to come into balance. 
Capacity creep 
The widely held view was that actual  capacities were well  above nameplate values,  and 
that creep over the medium term could be up to 1.5% pa plus. 
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In  broad  terms  what  the  industry  is  saying  is  that  they  see  no  relief  from  capacity 
exceeding demand in any meaningful time frame. 
Roland Berger & Partner comment: We  see no likelihood of demand catching up  with 
capacity in the foreseeable future.  We are bearish about the prospects for margins unless 
substantial capacity is removed. 
Eastern Europe 
It was widely agreed that East Europe is unlikely to affect western European refining for at 
least the next five to ten years. There could be a potential threat in the longer term. 
EuroPIA 
Generally, EuroPIA is valued as  a forum for discussion on  a range of issues. There was 
some  frustration  that  it  was  not  an  effective  forum  to  secure  agreed  positions  on  the 
fundamental  issue  of  the  poor  profitability  of  refining,  and  certainly  not  to  secure 
agreement on a closure fund or restructuring. 
Several interviewees commented that the  Environmental  lobby was  much more powerful 
in Europe than the refining industry, or indeed the oil/energy industries. 
3.2.2  Industry organisation interviews 
Industry bodies  and  other organisations  agreed  with  the  views  of the  oil  companies  in 
most areas. 
Capacity creep 
Many organisations  believe  that capacity  creep,  triggered  by  environmental  investment, 
will range between 1 to  1.5% pa plus.  The lEA has published forecasts showing creep in 
the range 0.5 to 0.75% pa. 
Closure fund 
While  proposals  for  an  industry-funded  closure  fund  have  been  explored,  industry 
consensus has not been reached. 
Diesel 
There  is  uncertainty  and  disagreement  as  to  whether  gasoline  or  diesel  is  the  more 
environmentally-friendly fuel overall for the longer term. 
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The  shortfall  of diesel  capacity  is  expected  to  worsen.  The  demand  for diesel  may  be 
relatively  insensitive  to  changing  taxation  in  the  short  term  because  of the  time  that  it 
takes to change the existing vehicles in the car-park. This effect will be  more pronounced 
in southern Europe than in the north. 
Eastern Europe 
Not expected  to  be  a  significant threat  in  the  short term,  although  the  lEA points  to  a 
refining centre developing in Hungary I Slovakia I Croatia. 
Environmental standards 
The unlevel playing field is seen as a problem, favouring some states and companies. 
Two organisations suggested environmental investment costs for 2000 of around  ECU  7 
billion rather than ECU 20 billion. 
Environmental standards should be based upon rigorous cost effectiveness analysis. 
Harmonisation 
There  is  support  for  harmonised  standards  across  Europe,  with  EuroPIA  expecting 
differentiated solutions between north and south. 
Oil company behaviour 
Seen as conservative and reactive. 
Joint ventures 
Broad support for encouraging more co-operation within the industry. 
Security of supply 
Security of supply is not considered a refining capacity issue at any likely level of capacity 
reduction, even if a significant number of refineries close. 
Product distribution infrastructure and stocks are key issues. 
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3.2.3  Government interviews 
The  governments  interviewed  preferred  free  market  approaches  for  most  issues  and 
supported the concept of a single market. 
One  government (with  substantial  domestic refining)  emphasised  that the  industry must 
put over a sense of urgency. 
"The industry must establish a sense of urgency,  and work on this with politicians 
and public. We receive few complaints from industry, there is no momentum." 
Types of solutions 
Free  market  solutions  and  actions,  alongside  regulatory  standards  which  are  set  for 
Europe as a whole, are preferred. 
One  government  was  keen  to  avoid  imposing  costs  on  taxpayers  or  detracting  from 
government revenues. 
There was some view that remediation standards should remain a national matter. 
Two governments emphasised strongly the need for harmonisation of taxes, one wanting 
the Commission to take a much tougher line here. 
Diesel 
There  is  strong  support  from  governments  for  reversing  diesel's  fiscal  advantages. 
However, this needs to take account of political opposition from truckers.  Solutions which 
include  separate  arrangements  for trucking,  and  also  road  tax  levels,  may  need  to  be 
found. 
Security of supply 
While a domestic refining industry is still considered important for security of supply there 
is no clear view on the preferred level. 
Closure cost 
There is some support for measures to share the closure cost across the industry. A fund 
modelled  on  the  successful  Dutch  service  station  closure fund  was  mentioned  by  more 
than one. 
DGIV's view is  that a closure fund  would  have  to  have  (near)  universal  support to gain 
approval. 
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Environmental 
One government was forceful in its view that: 
"We  are  very concerned.  The  2005 specifications are not justified and will be a 
high cost to the industry." 
JVs and mergers 
DGIV suggested that whereas bilateral industry deals will often be accepted,  multi-lateral 
deals are more likely to be challenged. 
Employment 
There was significant concern about the employment effect of closures in some countries. 
This was often linked to centres of industry locally, rather than to the total numbers which 
were accepted as relatively low. 
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4.  EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES 
A number of possible initiatives for overcoming  the  problems of the  industry have  been 
evaluated based on the following considerations: 
•  Refining profitability is unacceptably low 
•  EU refining capacity will continue to exceed demand for at least the next decade 
•  The  refining  market  is  a  fiercely  competitive,  transparent,  global  commodity 
business 
The  initiatives set out below have been  evaluated  on  the  basis of whether they will  help 
the oil refining industry to transform its economic performance while continuing to provide 
secure,  high  quality,  environmentally  friendly  energy  products  to  the  consumer  at 
competitive prices. 
4.1  CONTINUATION OF EXISTING POLICIES 
Before considering  any other initiatives,  it is  important to  decide whether leaving  market 
forces to take their natural course will resolve the situation. We therefore examined first of 
all  whether the  Commission  should  just continue  existing  macro-economic  and  energy 
policies and take no extra specific steps to solve the refining issue. 
These policies include, for example: 
•  Extension of the internal market 
•  European Monetary Union 
•  Liberalisation of energy markets 
•  Harmonisation of taxes, with a principle of neutrality between energies 
•  Assessing environmental standards on the basis of cost-effectiveness 
There are two basic premises which govern the outcome of following this path. They are: 
Premise 1: Our analysis of future supply and demand could be wrong, and growing 
demand could after all exceed refining capacity before 2010 
Under  this  assumption  margins  will  eventually  rise.  However,  even  on  current  lEA 
predictions demand will not exceed supply for the next decade. If contrary to expectations 
demand  does  rise  faster,  and  margins  do  rise,  there  will  be  an  import  parity  price  cap 
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which will ensure that profitability remains at an  unacceptable level - albeit at an  average 
return on capital employed around 7 to 8%. 
When significant tightening of supply became apparent it would discourage oil companies 
from joining in the necessary restructuring and rejuvenation of refining assets - but  would 
still leave an underperforming, increasingly uncompetitive industry. 
Low  profitability  will  continue  in  the  short  term,  structural  problems  will  remain,  and 
environmental enhancements are likely to be resisted by many within industry. 
Premise 2: Structural surplus remains in EU refining (as our analysis predicts) 
In  this  scenario,  consumer  prices  remain  low,  and  difficult  discussions  between  the 
Commission and individual member states can be avoided. At the same time, some hope 
can be read  into the restructuring that has already taken place in some EU  locations (e.g. 
BP/Mobil,  OMW/Esso  at  Karlsruhe)  and  the  number  of operations  that  have  recently 
closed  or announced  closure  (Gulf in  the  UK  and  KPC  in  Denmark).  It  is  possible  that 
additional  closures  may take  place  following  public announcements  of refineries  up  for 
sale (e.g. Lavera) and capacity to be rationalised (e.g. Berre). 
However, we believe there will  be no significant breakthrough in overcoming poor refining 
profitability for the following reasons: 
•  The  industry  has  been  wrestling  with  the  problem  for  over  a  decade  with 
inadequate margins continuing - but not triggering the needed restructuring 
•  Closure  costs  are  so  high  that  it  is  better  to  generate  cash  from  the  sunk 
refining investment than to divest 
•  The few refiners that will close will  not take out enough capacity to tighten the 
market - and so margins will remain low 
•  Many of the players are hopeful that others will leave first 
•  Hidden  subsidies  and  exit  barriers  in  individual  EU  member  states  distort 
commercial decisions 
With no prospects of adequate returns, the industry will be driven to minimising investment 
and  operating  on  a  "care  and  maintenance"  basis  only.  Thus  EU  refining  will  not  be 
rejuvenated  and  the  industry  will  strongly  resist  the  imposition  of  even  tighter 
environmental  standards.  If this  occurs,  there  is  a high  probability  that the  industry will 
become less and  less competitive in  the international market where it has to operate, to 
the detriment of the EU's energy market, and in the longer term the consumer. 
Our conclusion is  that without some intervention by the Commission there will  be 
no  significant  breakthrough  by  the  industry  itself  in  overcoming  poor  refining 
profitability.  This  risks  leaving  an  increasingly  uncompetitive  industry  in  a  key 
strategic sector. 
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As a consequence other, preferred, initiatives must be considered. 
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4.2  PREFERRED INITIATIVES 
For ease of analysis, we have grouped the preferred initiatives in the following categories: 
•  Initiative 1 - "Soft Options" to reduce costs to the industry 
•  Initiative 2 - Stringent but realistic environmental specs - with a cost  recovery 
mechanism for refiners 
•  Initiative 3 - EC encouragement of an industry "shake-out" 
•  Initiative 4 - Removal of distortions to create a "level playing field" 
•  Initiative 5 - Changing the profit and pricing signals 
These  various  approaches  are  not all  mutually exclusive and  elements of them  can  be 
combined as appropriate to tackle specific problems. 
4.2.1  Initiative 1: "Soft Options" to Reduce Costs to the Industry 
Most of the refining industry wants to see initiatives that reduce costs of exit and  costs of 
environmental compliance. We have therefore considered: 
•  An industry-sponsored closure fund 
•  Lowering  exit  barriers  by  sensible  changes  to  application  of environmental 
remediation standards and a realistic time frame for implementation 
•  Softening  the  indicative target 2005  fuel  specifications  to  come  closer to  the 
original Auto-oil 1 proposals for 2010 
A well-thought out closure fund would benefit the industry considerably and share the pain 
of high  exit  costs.  If at  the  same  time  governments  lowered  exit  barriers  by  changing 
remediation  standards,  and  allowing  longer to  carry out remedial  work,  refinery closures 
could  go  ahead  rapidly.  The  tighter  product  supply  and  lower  investment  costs  for 
environment  enhancement  will  raise  margins  and  improve  industry  return  on  capital 
employed.  Provided the  closure fund  was successful in  closing enough capacity,  it could 
improve  ongoing  margins  substantially  for  a  relatively  small  investment  by  industry 
markets. We estimate margins could  rise  by up to  ECU  0.80/bbl ($0.90/bbl) for a one-off 
cost of ECU  0.20/bbl  ($0.25/bbl)  (based  on  12  refineries  closing  at an  average  cost  of 
ECU 100 million for each refinery closed). 
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However,  if the weaker players are to close (the only sensible economic result) then the 
fund  has to  be  selective. This could  be very difficult to agree and  realise in  practice,  and 
will require clear, appropriate rules for operations of the fund.  Furthermore, if closures do 
not  achieve  a  level  approaching  70-1 OOMta  (the  estimated  refining  capacity  removal 
required) the capacity surplus will continue to depress margins. 
Another problem with the closure fund is that there are many operators in the industry who 
do  not want (at  least presently) to  participate.  Without all  parties  involved  this  will  be  a 
non-starter and could merely delay tackling the fundamental problems of the industry. It is 
worth giving the fund  one  last chance but a tight deadline for reaching agreement will  be 
essential.  In any event DGIV have commented that unless all the players participate it will 
not satisfy their anti-competitive criteria. 
A  much  greater  concern  with  this  set  of  initiatives  is  that  by  softening  the  fuel 
specifications the EU's target environmental specifications for air quality for 2005 - 2010 
will not be met.  This could  prove to  be politically unacceptable particularly if seen to be a 
mechanism to assist the  oil  industry.  The oil  industry is  perceived  by the general public, 
pressure groups and many politicians to be very wealthy and influential. The general view 
would  almost  certainly  be  that  the  industry  has  adequate  funds  to  sort  out  its  own 
problems. 
4.2.2  Initiative  2:  Environmental  standards  met  by  stringent,  but  realistic 
specifications, with cost recovery by the refiners 
The action steps examined for this set of initiatives are: 
•  A  rigorous  assessment of the  cost effectiveness  of the  year 2005  indicative 
target fuel specifications 
•  A mechanism to recover the investment cost in  refineries for the resultant fuel 
specifications from consumers 
•  An incentive through tax differentiation for consumers to buy cleaner fuels. 
The new Auto Oil 2 programme is due to reassess the cost-effectiveness of the year 2005 
indicative  target specifications  proposed  in  the  Council's  "Common  Position"  as  well  as 
other measures suggested to  meet the air quality objectives.  In  this initiative we  assume 
that  re-assessment  will  result  in  agreed  fuel  specifications  that  are  still  stringent  by 
comparison with the year 2000 specifications, but will be fully cost effective in meeting the 
target air standards. We anticipate that the resultant investment needs for the oil  industry 
will still be large (greater than ECU 10 billion). 
To  recover these  investment costs  we  examined  tax  differentiation  as  a mechanism  to 
provide a return to refiners on their investments, and to incentivise consumers to switch to 
cleaner fuels.  This would  be  applied  by  individual  governments or across the  European 
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Union, not as a mandatory change of specification on a particular date, but as a higher tax 
on the older specification fuel for a specified period of time. 
The  best mechanism would  need  to  be  worked  out  in  detail  between  the  industry,  the 
Commission and  member state governments. The Swedish or Finnish tax differentiation 
models for 'City' transport fuels may be a useful precedent. The level of tax differentiation 
needs to  be  carefully chosen  to ensure that refiners  can  get an  increased  margin while 
allowing a slightly lower pump price for the cleaner fuel to encourage consumers to switch. 
The price differential should not be so high that it acts as harshly as a sudden mandatory 
change.  Our  analysis  suggests  that  suitable  levels  of  differentiation  (if,  after 
reassessment, the industry cost remains as high as ECU  25 bn to upgrade from the 2000 
specifications) would be about 3.0 ECU cents per litre on diesel, and about 2.0 ECU cents 
per litre on  gasoline. These levels are substantially lower than the tax differentiation that 
most EU countries have introduced between gasoline and diesel. 
The arguments against tax differentiation are that the proceeds may not benefit refiners, 
and that it introduces yet another economic distortion. 
The normal process of tax differentiation involves the government collecting a higher tax 
on  the  dirtier fuel  (for neutrality it  should  also  reduce  the  tax on  the  cleaner fuel).  The 
benefit to the refiner is indirect. If the duty is collected by the marketer or wholesaler, they 
will  have an  incentive to pay a higher price for cleaner fuel  to refiners - at least until the 
product is the standard grade in the market. 
In countries where the refiner pays the excise duty, he has the option to keep most of the 
differential and  only  pass  on  a small  cost saving  for the  cleaner fuel  to  marketers  and 
wholesalers. Marketers may demand an extra incentive if they have to build  new systems 
for handling an extra grade at terminals and service stations. The refiner can alternatively 
give away all the differential and rely on fast volume increase at his competitors' expense 
to gain extra margin. The latter tactic risks removing the differential too fast,  particularly if 
consumers do not have to change cars to be able to use the cleaner fuel - when there is 
no more dirty fuel in the market the differential automatically disappears. 
In  either  case,  when  a  number  of key  suppliers  in  the  market  have  upgraded  their 
specifications,  and  there  has  been  substantial  consumer switching  to  the  new fuel,  the 
normal competitive processes will start to erode away the differential. This has happened 
in Sweden and Finland after the introduction of 'City' fuels. 
It is possible to make the refiner's recovery direct, if the government pays proceeds of the 
tax differentiation direct to refiners in proportion to their sales of the cleaner fuel. Since the 
government income starts very large and reduces, while refiners will start with very small 
but increasing volumes, the allocation of tax revenues would be complicated. 
Tax differentiation does not create a long term structural change in industry margins. It is a 
short-term measure to incentivise both refiners and consumers to switch to the new fuels, 
with an economic reward for those who do so quickly. 
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Tax differentiation would  not have an  equal effect for all refiners,  and  to this extent could 
be  regarded  as  a  distortion.  Uncompetitive  refineries  with  obsolescent  equipment  and 
higher upgrading  costs  than  average  will  be  put  under pressure.  Those  refineries  best 
placed to compete in  high value added global markets will gain.  It is  in  our view precisely 
these refineries  that the  EU  needs to  encourage  in  order to  retain  EU  competitiveness, 
and which are the most likely to invest regularly in technical improvements to bring down 
costs to consumers. 
An  alternative  mechanism  for  rewarding  refiners  for  upgrading  fuel  specifications  is  to 
incentivise environmental investment by creating special tax credits. There is a problem of 
definition of what environmental investment covers (for instance, is a hydrocracker built to 
supply growing diesel demand, or to reduce sulphur levels in diesel?). More seriously, tax 
credits would discriminate against refiners who have already upgraded their units. 
A decision to initiate the move towards the new tighter specifications by tax differentiation 
soon  after 2000 would  give  positive encouragement to the  industry.  It would  also allow 
investment to be phased in as demand changes. At the same time the environment would 
benefit from  a partial  implementation earlier than  planned.  This fits  in  well with  the EU's 
position for Kyoto. 
Substantial  closures  would  still  be  required  to  make  the  industry  profitable.  Weaker 
refineries in  a poor position to upgrade to the new standards should  be allowed to close. 
However, the wider restructuring required may not happen. There is a danger, too, as has 
previously been experienced, that the industry will overbuild upgrading capacity. 
It is  possible that the higher quality material available could  increase export opportunities 
(particularly for high  quality gasoline  to  the  USA)  and  boost  margins  in  the  industry  by 
raising the EU's global competitiveness in refining. 
The cost of this option to the consumer is relatively small and  reflects the "polluter pays" 
principle. 
A combination of this option with the encouragement of refiners to seek industry alliances 
and  pool  new  upgrading  capacity  while  closing  obsolescent  plants  could  make  this  an 
attractive proposition. 
4.2.3  Initiative 3:  EC encouragement of an industry "shake-out" 
We have argued above that EU refining industry needs a "shake-out". We examined steps 
which the Commission could take to help this, as follows: 
•  The European Commission encourages wider, faster industry restructuring 
•  The Commission takes steps with governments to identify and  remove hidden 
subsidies and obstacles to closure. 
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•  Support is given to the introduction of the European Company Statute. 
In  order  to  achieve  an  industry  "shake-out",  we  believe  the  Commission  will  need  to 
positively encourage  the  oil  refining  industry to  restructure.  It  can  do  this  by  sending  a 
clear signal to the industry that restructuring will be welcomed by the Commission and  by 
member states;  by removing  unnecessary obstacles to mergers and  acquisitions;  and  by 
agreeing guidelines for cross-border deals with member states. 
This is particularly important in the case of the oil  industry which has a history of extreme 
sensitivity  about  being  accused  of  anti-competitive  practice,  and  also  fears  that 
governments  in  Europe  will  not  approve  cross-border  alliances.  Clearly,  consumer 
interests must be protected, but restructuring of the industry is dependent on  its ability to 
form  alliances  like  those  formed  by  BP/Mobil  and  by  OMW/Esso at Karlsruhe,  and  the 
industry should be encouraged in this direction. 
There is a wide-spread belief that there are many subsidies and hidden barriers to closure 
used  by member states throughout the  Region.  It is well  recognised  by the  industry that 
this  is  a "tough  nut to  crack"  for the  EC,  but  creating  a genuinely  level  playing  field  is 
critical to reducing restructuring and merger costs. 
The EU· Company Statute currently under discussion, would enable companies to operate 
as single entities in the community. There are a number of advantages from this approach 
not least of which is that restructuring and merger costs would be reduced. 
Overall,  the  steps  in  this  initiative  can  only  influence  rather  than  initiate  the  needed 
changes.  However, these steps would encourage normal play of market forces and  steer 
the Region towards finding less parochial solutions to oil refining overcapacity. 
4.2.4  Initiative 4: Remove Distortions and Create a "Level Playing Field" 
The actions examined under this set of initiatives are: 
•  Remove hidden subsidies and exit barriers 
•  Remove the tax advantage on diesel 
•  Harmonise EU fuel taxes 
•  Harmonise EU fuel specifications 
•  Agree harmonised site remediation standards 
Actions are necessary to overcome the distortions present in the EU in order to establish a 
"level playing field" for the oil refining industry to rationalise its operations. 
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Individual  government  incentives  and  inducements  to  retain  what  would  otherwise  be 
closure  candidates should  be  removed.  At the  same time,  there are  many different and 
variable fuel taxes in operation throughout the Region which need to be harmonised if the 
correct commercial decisions are to be taken by the industry. 
The  logic  of the  tax  differential  between  motor  gasoline  and  diesel  in  almost  all  EU 
countries needs to be reviewed in terms of environmental benefit and the economic public 
interest.  It is our view that the differential should  be  removed.  The industry is  now faced 
with  the  necessity of installing  very  costly  hydrocracking  capacity to  meet future  diesel 
demand.  If the original logic for this differentiation has disappeared, the market distortion 
needs  to  be  eliminated.  However,  any  change will  take  several  years  before there  is  a 
significant impact on gasoline surpluses. 
Fuel specifications need to be harmonised to prevent refiners in one region having to bear 
unnecessarily high  costs.  In  particular, the  Commission should  agree a set of consistent 
guidelines  to  harmonise  remedial  measures  required  following  refinery  closure  and  to 
establish a realistic time frame for implementation. Although the main differences between 
very high  and  very low closure  costs  relate to different soils  and  locations,  a substantial 
percentage of clean-up costs can be affected by inconsistent standards for other factors. 
Directionally  these  initiatives  are  desirable  as  they  start  to  redress  the  many  market 
distortions and are in line with policies for the Single Market. Removal of hidden subsidies 
and  exit barriers may encourage some closures.  However, the economic impact and  the 
impetus for restructuring would  be  small  unless other measures are also put in  place at 
the same time. 
4.2.5  Initiative 5: Change Industry Profit and Pricing Signals 
Two initiatives have been examined here: 
•  Put pressure on the industry to publish transparent accounts for refining in Europe 
•  Clarify the accounting treatment of write-downs for consistently unprofitable refineries 
A discussion  point for the  oil  industry is  the  extent to  which  the  upstream,  refining  and 
marketing should  be decoupled and separate accounts disclosed to the shareholder.  It is 
now  common  practice  in  the  industry  to  do  this  internally  but,  at  best,  annual  reports 
delineate separate results only between the upstream and  the downstream (refining and 
marketing combined). 
Requiring transparent accounting disclosure in  order to "unbundle" the different business 
sectors  is  a  powerful  weapon  to  expose  to  shareholders  the  poor  return  on  invested 
capital  in  refining.  This  would  not  be  popular with  the  industry  but  is  likely  to  have  a 
dramatic effect on closure and restructuring decisions by company  management, who will 
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be  under  considerable  pressure  to  improve.  An  attitude  change  in  the  industry  would 
discourage cross-subsidisation and encourage a realistic perspective on long term pricing. 
This measure could  usefully be supported by a clarification of the treatment of provisions 
in the accounts for "impaired" refinery assets. These are refineries which are not making a 
profit,  and  for  which  closure  or  sale  would  require  large  write-downs  of hundreds  of 
millions of dollars per refinery.  Within  Europe only BP  appears  recently to  have made a 
substantial  such  provision.  Other  companies  have  not  made  such  provisions  even  for 
consistently  loss-making  refineries.  They  therefore tend  to  put  off action  until  it will  not 
have an adverse effect on shareholder sentiment. 
The  industry  is  mostly  opposed  to  such  changes,  and  implementation  and  accounting 
rules will take time to establish. There is  however a recent precedent in  Europe with the 
banking industry, where with  Commission support the accounting bodies have had  some 
success in agreeing uniform standards of disclosure and provisions. 
Changes in  accountancy rules to separate business sector performance would  drive the 
companies  to  address  low  profitability  in  refining.  This  is  not  a  short  term  solution. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  a powerful  tool  for shareholder,  and  therefore management,  focus.  It 
could  therefore  consolidate  the  gains  of  restructuring  through  a  change  in  company 
behaviour for the long term. 
4.3  UNACCEPTABLE INITIATIVES 
During  the  course  of the  project  further  initiatives  were  considered  but  discarded  as 
follows: 
•  Forcing closure through decree 
- This was seen as too interventionist 
•  Limiting production through quotas 
- Seen as anti-competitive and does not solve structural problems 
•  Import protection through Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) and tariffs 
- Contravenes world trade agreements. 
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5.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the evaluation of the preferred options Roland Berger & Partner recommend 
five  combined  action  steps  to  secure  the  long-term viability and  competitiveness  of the 
refining industry in Europe while protecting the public interest. 
An "enabling" stance by the Commission 
to kick-start industry restructuring 
Tax differentiation 
as an incentive for 
stringent, but 
realistic, 
environmental 
specifications 
Increased accounting 
transparency to secure 
structural gains 
Remove· distortions and· 
create a  "level playing field" 
5.1  THE COMMISSION "KICK-STARTS" THE IMPROVEMENT PROCESS 
Reduce 
closure costs 
The  success of these  proposals  is  dependent on  the  extent of the  commitment of the 
industry, governments and the Commission. 
We recommend that the Commission, through DGXV/1,  kick-starts a more urgent impetus 
for restructuring by bringing together all the interested parties in a top level management 
exchange of  views. 
The purpose of this exchange of views would  be  for the Commission's Directorates,  co-
ordinated by DGXVII: 
•  to communicate the  reasons for their concerns about the state of the oil  refining 
industry in Europe 
•  to explain the initiatives DGXVII has been taking to understand the real problems. 
•  to  set out  DGXVII's  understanding  of the  situation,  and  its  support for  industry 
restructuring 
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•  to  state  publicly  a commitment to  "enable"  restructuring  to  happen  by  taking  all 
reasonable steps to create a level playing field and to remove market distortions by 
individual member states. 
•  to enable other Directorates,  particularly DGs  Ill,  IV,  and  XI,  and  the  Industry,  to 
state their positions 
•  to agree the next action steps and a timetable 
DGXVII  would  make  absolutely  clear  to  this  multilateral  audience  that  it  is  the  oil 
industry's responsibility to take early action but with the strong support and commitment of 
the other participants. 
We recommend that one follow-up exchange then be held about a year later at which the 
Commission and the industry would report on progress. 
5.2  TAX DIFFERENTIATION TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS 
We recommend that the  Commission carefully reassesses the year 2005 indicative target 
fuel  specifications,  as  planned through  the  Auto-Oil II programme,  to  agree  truly cost-
effective measures which will meet the EU's targets for air quality in 2010. 
We recommend that the resultant agreed specification changes from the year 2000 levels 
should not be introduced as mandatory specifications, but should be gradually introduced 
some time  after January 2000 by regulating an  EU-wide tax differentiation to  encourage 
refiners and consumers to  switch to  the  new specifications.  To  trigger early oil industry 
action,  tax differentials would be announced for a limited specified time  - preferably five 
years, but for a minimum of  four years. 
Although  we  have  not  specifically  reviewed  the  cost  to  the  industry  of pollutants  and 
emissions from their refineries  we  believe,  in  principle,  that they should  cover their own 
environmental costs of refining emissions. 
We  recommend  that general ground rules  should  be  set to  prevent distortions  in  the 
application of requirements  for control of refinery emissions.  We  recommend that these 
rules  should  be  based  on  cost-effectiveness  rather  than  Best  Available  Technology 
criteria. 
5.3  RISK-BASED CLOSURE COSTS AND INDUSTRY CLOSURE FUND 
We  recommend that closure costs be based on the  sensible application of objective and 
harmonised  environmental  risk-based  criteria  for  the  remediation  of a  site  and  an 
extended time allowed for implementation. 
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Unless there are exceptional circumstances, we recommend that remediation should be to 
industrial re-use standards, not for horticulture or housing.  This would best be harmonised 
by the Commission providing closure guideline standards across Europe. 
We  recommend that the  Commission give serious consideration to capping a company's 
environmental liabilities  once  clean-up  has been  independently audited as having been 
completed to the required standards. 
In our view it would be inappropriate for the EU to use State funds to assist closure. 
Although the  chances of success may not be  high,  the  potential  benefit to all  parties  is 
large enough that we  believe a final  attempt to  agree an  industry-financed  closure  fund 
should be made. A deadline must be set on the attempt to find agreement on a fund if it is 
not to be an excuse for delay. We suggest that the industry should be given a deadline of 
the end of June 1998 to agree a mechanism between themselves and with DGIV. 
We  recommend  that a  final attempt should be made to  establish  an  industry-financed 
closure fund,  but within a tight time limit. 
5.4  REMOVAL OF MEMBER STATE DISTORTIONS 
We  recommend that steps be taken by the  Commission and governments to identify and 
remove distortions and create a level playing field across member states for oil refining. 
This  should specifically address: 
•  equalisation of gasoline and diesel taxes; 
•  harmonising EU fuel taxes between member states 
•  limiting fuel specification differences across Europe 
There is also a need to identify hidden incentives and exit barriers across Europe. This will 
inevitably be more difficult. Examples of types of hidden incentives and barriers are set out 
in the Appendix. 
5.5  PROVIDING A MECHANISM TO CEMENT STRUCTURAL GAINS 
Ideally there  should  also  be  a  mechanism  to  identify and  then  to  secure the  structural 
gains made so that the same problems do not arise in the future with the same severity. 
Without such  a  mechanism  we  fear that  the  marginal  pricing  behaviour of the  refining 
industry would reassert itself after a short period and drive the industry back into chronic 
underperformance. 
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We recommend the development of  new accounting disclosure rules so that integrated oil 
companies  show  separate  divisional  post-tax  results  for  refining  operations  in  annual 
accounts. 
In  advance  of these  being  available  the  industry should  be  encouraged  to  do  so  on  a 
voluntary basis. Broad guidelines and an agreed early start date could be co-ordinated by 
EuroPIA. 
We  recommend a review of the  accounting treatment of write  downs  of non-performing 
refining assets  .. 
It is  important in  the  current state of the  industry that refiners adopt a similar treatment, 
and do not hide from their shareholders the potential costs of closure or write-downs in the 
event of sale. 
5.6  POTENTIAL "QUICK HITS" 
If some  'quick  hits'  for  local  restructuring,  mergers,  or closures  could  be  identified  this 
would  be  a way  of giving  fast  impetus  to  the  required  restructuring.  The  management 
exchange of views could be used to identify these. 
It is  not within the  remit of this study to  evaluate particular candidates for closure.  Each 
case will  require  complex analysis.  However,  as  a starter to the management exchange 
we suggest the following are re-addressed: 
•  France (South-East refinery cluster) 
•  Germany (Bavaria) 
•  Ireland  (Whitegate- any closure  would  need  the  security of guaranteed  supplies 
from a European refiner, preferably backed by supplies of North Sea crude oil) 
A number of other opportunities which might require more extensive evaluation are: 
•  Belgium (Antwerp complex) 
•  Germany (Harburg) 
•  Greece (Athens) 
•  Italy (North) 
•  Italy (Sicily) 
•  Netherlands (Rotterdam complex) - Nerefco is already closing 
•  Sweden (Gothenborg) 
•  UK (Pembrokeshire)- Gulf is already closing 
•  UK (Killingholme) 
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•  UK (Thames Estuary) 
Further considerations for potential closure are set out in the Appendix. 
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5. 7  POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
We calculate the following potential impact from our recommendations: 
5.7.1  Restructuring  including  regional  mergers  could  lead  to  a removal  over the 
next 5 to 7 years of 70-100 million tonnes of capacity (10-15%) if action is taken 
at the same time to reduce closure costs.  If there is  no  industry closure fund  to 
bear the  major cost of closures,  the  level  of closures  will  be  less  and  slower. 
Action will in most cases be triggered when a major investment for environmental 
reasons becomes necessary. 
When  sufficient  surplus  capacity  has  been  removed,  margins  will  start  to 
increase, but will, we believe be limited by import arbitrage to about 0.8 ECU/bbl 
above  current  levels.  This  is  equivalent  to  ECU  0.005  per  litre  on  consumer 
prices.  Closure  of capacity  which  includes  a  high  proportion  of upgrading  to 
gasoline will have the quickest effect on margins. 
5.7.2.  Environmental investment needs for the move to 2005 fuel specifications from 
the  Council's  'common  position'  levels  for  2000  depend  on  the  specifications 
finally  agreed  for  2005-2010.  Based  on  the  Council's  proposals  these  needs 
would cost up to ECU 25 billion. 
Tax differentiation will  spread the  investment over several years,  and  will  need, 
we  estimate,  about an  extra  3.0  ECU  cents/litre tax on  'dirty' diesel,  and  about 
2.0  ECU  cents/litre  on  'dirty'  gasoline.  Some  of this  will  pass  to  consumers  to 
create a small financial incentive to switch fuel, the majority is likely to be kept by 
refiners.  The  cost to  consumers will  only  be  paid  by  customers  who  stay with 
dirtier fuels - this will be a declining figure over time. 
Our  calculations  of  investment  and  differential  taxes  will  be  altered 
proportionately  if  the  recommended  review  of  2005  indicative  target  fuel 
specifications results in a change of some of the more costly specifications. 
5.7.3  Closure  cost  reductions  and  harmonisation  across  the  EU  could  save 
substantial amounts in  individual cases, with, we  estimate, an  average of some 
10m ECU per refinery. 
An  industry  closure  fund  would  probably  need  to  be  financed  by  a  levy  on 
refiners  of up  to  ECU  1.50/tonne  installed.  This  cost  would  not  be  borne  by 
consumers. 
5.7.4  Removal  of  distortions  would  improve  the  efficiency  of  market-led 
restructuring, while accounting transparency would  prolong the margin benefit 
of efficient restructuring. 
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5.7.5  Restructuring and the more competitive structures that these recommendations 
would encourage, would lead to cost savings and other efficiency improvements 
in  the  longer term.  Discussions with  industry experts suggest that these  could 
create up to an  average 1.0 ECU/bbl saving, which would largely be passed on 
to consumers. 
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1.  Terms of Reference 
The  call  for  tender  document specifies  the  following  Terms  of Reference  for  this 
project. 
1.1.  Background 
The framework of this study is the Working Document of the Commission "Report on 
the situation of Oil Supply, Refining, and Markets in the European Community", COM 
(96)143 and the Energy Council Conclusions of 3 December 1996 on the same. 
The  subject  of  the  above  Report  was  to  identify  and  explore  the  key  issues 
concerning  the  above  sectors,  in  particular  refining  industry  performance,  the 
environment,  security  of  supply,  the  Internal  Market  and  where  appropriate  to 
comment on the implications for the Community. 
The Commission has received a mandate from the Council to examine in  depth the 
main causes of the current difficulties in  the Refining  Sector. The present study will 
deepen  the  analysis  of  the  most  important  issues  identified  in  the  Commission 
Report. 
1.2.  Objective 
The final objective is to deepen the understanding of the causes of poor profitability 
and how they interact, and  how the sector is  likely to develop on  current trends.  In 
addition possible options for the improvement of the sector's performance should be 
identified  and  analysed.  Where  appropriate  analysis  should  be  undertaken  on  a 
regional basis rather than at a Community or national level. 
1.3.  Scope of Work 
i.  The  consultant  will  have  to  address  the  main  issues  identified  in  the 
Commission's Report as contributing to poor profitability in the sector and any 
others  identified  during  the  course  of the  study.  In  particular the  following 
areas will need to be addressed: 
ii.  Inventory of current refining capacities in  the Community including details of 
ownership  and  current  status  etc.  together  with  an  analysis  of how  this 
corresponds to the forecast supply and demand in iii). 
iii.  Current crude supply data and forecast developments over the period up until 
2010.  Current and  forecast trade  patterns and  flows for the major products. 
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For  both  crude  and  products  trade  should  be  analysed  not  only  from  a 
community  wide  perspective  but  also  where  appropriate  on  a  regional  or 
national  basis.  The  implications of an  expanded  Community and  developing 
trade arrangements with would-be Member States should also be  taken  into 
consideration, as should the global market where appropriate. 
iv.  Capacity Creep.  The apparent contradiction of high  reported  utilisation rates 
and  excess  capacity  should  be  addressed  by  examining  the  subject  of 
capacity  creep  and  how  this  effects  the  existing  publicly  quoted  utilisation 
rates. 
v.  Diesel  and  gasoline supply and  demand developments.  Some  regions  have 
experienced  a  shift  in  demand  from  gasoline  to  diesel  for  transport 
requirements  and  the  reasons  for  this  should  be  examined  in  detail.  In 
particular the role of taxation, duties and VAT, should be examined in order to 
establish  their  influence  across  the  Community.  Current  and  future 
developments  in  technology  of  both  gasoline  and  diesel  vehicles  and 
transportation trends  should  also be  considered  in  this  context.  Changes  in 
the  general  structure  of  the  retail  sector  such  as  effective  separation  of 
refining and marketing, concentration and distribution developments including 
the entry of hypermarkets should be addressed under this heading. 
vi.  Clean  up  costs for refinery closures.  It  has  been  suggested that these  may 
have  led  to  inefficient  refineries  remaining  open,  or  being  mothballed,  or 
being  sold  at  low  prices  to  investors  with  different strategic  objectives  and 
these  issues  should  be  examined  in  depth.  The  range  of environmental 
requirements,  the  costs,  including  the  range  of  tax  treatment  across  the 
Community should be addressed together with the historic background to the 
issues.  In  particular  where  requirements  have  changed  these  should  be 
highlighted and the source of the requirements, be it environmental legislation 
or lease conditions should be identified where possible. 
vii.  Employment.  The  number  of  workers  in  the  Refinery  sector  should  be 
established, including direct employees of refinery companies and employees 
in  supporting services and  industries in  order to understand the employment 
implications of developments in the sector. 
viii.  Current  situation.  An  update  of the  refining  sector  should  be  presented 
including details of planned closures, sales, joint ventures, financial schemes 
etc. The impact of current EU government policies should also be considered, 
including  general  industrial  and  social  policy;  extending  to  related 
downstream activities  such  as  the  petrochemical  sector where  appropriate. 
The strategic nature of the refining sector and the issues of security of supply 
should also be given due priority. " 
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2.  Refining Margins And Profitability 
2.1.  Marker Margins 
There are several marker margins that are used  by the  industry to track the day to 
day and longer term developments of refinery gate, wholesale, product markets. 
The  most  popular  crudes  are:  Brent,  at  Rotterdam  and  US  Gulf;  West  Texas 
Intermediate at US Gulf;  Dubai and  Arab Light,  usually at Singapore. These crudes 
are taken as either being available in significant quantities or because they are used 
as a norm for trading. The locations normally represent the  major refining centres of 
the world. 
The  process configuration  is  normally either Hydroskimming or Complex.  Note that 
much  confusion  can  arise from  these terms.  Care  needs to  be  taken to  understand 
which combination of processes has been taken (e.g. cat cracking, hydrocracking, or 
both,  for  complex;  and  for  hydroskimming,  distillation  plus  reforming)  and  which 
mode  of operation  (e.g.  maximum  mogas  or  maximum  middle  distillate).  Which 
product  quality  is  produced  is  also  important,  for  mogas,  diesel  and  fuel  oils  in 
particular, as it directly influences both yield and price. 
It  is  particularly  important  to  note  that  the  marker  margin  is  usually  the  Gross 
Refiners Margin, i.e.  it is the value of products produced from a barrel of crude, with 
the  refinery fuel  and  loss taken from the  crude  barrel,  and  before the  deduction  of 
cash costs and overheads. 
Above all, it is vital, when a "margin" is quoted, to be very clear what margin is being 
used. Major confusion arises on this point. 
2.2.  GRM definition and margin trends 
The Rotterdam Brent Complex Margin is the one most commonly quoted in  Europe. 
We  have  adopted  the  deemed  yield  used  by  the  lEA.  Figure  1.  Other  industry 
markers use different deemed yields, or in some cases vary the yield measured each 
month  by  'optimisation'  against  spot  product  prices.  This  margin  (or  the  Brent 
Hydroskimming Margin if that were the one being used) is the Gross Refiners Margin 
(GRM). Note three points: 
•  The refinery fuel and loss, by convention, is taken out of the GRM 
•  For a complex yield there will be a volume gain from the conversion units. 
•  The net effect of the above two points is to reduce the output,  on  a volume 
basis, to 0.983 barrels of product per barrel of intake Brent crude, processed 
through the underlying process configuration to the defined product yield. 
Page 3 I 
I 
Appendix Two 
Ill  --------------------------- ·--------------------------
1.000 
barrel 
crude 
Figure 1 
- Refinery fuel & loss 
+  Volume gain 
Middle 
Dletlllate 
Fuel 
oil 
%volume 
91 
28 6 
46 3 
14 4 
98.3 
Price 
S/bb! 
21  60 
22 89 
25 81 
16 26 
22.89 
0.983 
barrel 
products 
Crude  (100.0)  (20.65) 
Gross refiners margin -$2.24/bbl 
S year average GRM NWE approximately $2.10/bbl 
Brent Complex Margin· Rotterdam (1996 averages) 
On  this  basis  the  Rotterdam  Brent  complex  margin  has  been  of  the  order  of 
$1.751bbl- $2.001bbl  (ECU  1.55- 1.75 per barrel)  over the  last decade  or so,  as 
shown  in  appendix  2.9.  There  was  a peak at the  time  of the  Gulf War,  when  the 
margin approached $41bbl  (ECU  3.501bbl),  but this cannot be  regarded as structural 
margin. 
During  the  past five  years  the  Mediterranean  complex margin  (measured  as  Urals 
crude  oil  Gross  Refiners  Margin  - Mediterranean)  has  averaged  about $0.45 I  bbl 
(ECU 0.40 I bbl) above the Rotterdam Brent Complex margin. 
As  described  in  the  main  report,  this  level  is  not  sufficient  for  adequate  industry 
profitability. The linkage between GRM  and  Return  on  Capital Employed (ROCE) is 
developed further in this Appendix two. 
2.3.  Net Refiners Margin 
Once the GRM  has been defined the Net Refiners Margin (NRM) can  be calculated 
by deducting the cash costs and allocated general cost (overheads). As indicated in 
Figure 2, for complex processing these are of the order of $1.751bbl  (ECU  1.551bbl) 
crude with a range of say +1- $0.50 (ECU 0.45). 
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$2.10/bbl 
Figure 2 
-·-----------·-
$1.75/bbl 
-
0.65 
0.40 
0.20 
0.25 
0.25 
Cash costs 
&overheads 
Net Refiners Margin $0.35/bbl  ________________________________________  ___. 
Salaries, wages and 
benefits 
Maintenance 
Catalysts and chemicals 
A II other costs 
Allocated general costs 
Stock holding 
Components of Net Refiners Margin (NRM) 
A typical Rotterdam Brent NRM  has been of the order of $0.35/bbl (ECU  0.30) over 
the last few years, the figure of $0.35/bbl being that for 1996. 
GRMs  increase  with  complexity  of  processing  but  so  do  the  cash  costs  and 
overheads.  The  capital  cost  of the  more  sophisticated  equipment,  on  which  it  is 
necessary to earn a return is also higher. 
2.4.  Marker NRMs and individual refinery positions 
The Brent based GRMs and NRMs described so far are ONLY MARKER MARGINS. 
They  are  not  typical  or  average  or  maximum  margins.  Their  sole  purpose  is  to 
provide  the  industry  with  a  simple  marker  of market  trends,  based  upon  defined 
assumptions. 
An analogy can be drawn with the stock markets where the FTSE 1  00 or Hang Seng 
index  is  a  marker.  There  are  many  other  markers.  Further,  the  marker  is  most 
unlikely to correspond to individual portfolios, where the individual investor will  have 
made unique choices to optimise his portfolio. 
It is exactly the same in the refining business. Each refiner will have made a range of 
specific  choices  on  the  plant  he  has  installed,  and,  how  it  is  to  be  operated.  In 
addition, he will have optimised his trading position and the mix of different crudes to 
process,  and  optimised  his  processing  conditions  and  blending  options.  Actual 
refinery  yields  may  therefore  be  substantially  different  from  the  marker  margin 
deemed yields.  Most importantly, many refiners produce so called special products, 
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particularly  lubricating  oils,  bitumen,  solvents  and  LPG,  all  of which  carry  added 
value  (and  added  costs!).  There  may  also  be  synergies  with  petro-chemicals.  An 
outline of some of the many individual variables is given in Figure 3. 
Inbound logistics  Primary and tPeCOndary 
procssefng 
Blendlft9  Outbound logletfcs I 
Crudes available  •  Specials  •  Blending flexibility  •  Own channels/ 
•  Term/spot price  - LPG, solvents,  •  Components  disposals 
1/)  mix  lubes, bitumen  available  •  Term/spot price 
5~  Feedstocks and  •  Actual processes  •  Off-spec problems  mix  :e!  g_o  1ntermed1ates  •  Yield optimisation  •  Trad1ng  opt10ns  •  Quality niches and 
i6~  Freight options  •  Operating effiaency  premium 
::JQ) 
•  Trading capability  •  Fuel usage  •  Shipping and  ~~ 
·- (IJ  •  Terminalling  •  Catalyst  transport  ~> 
capability  management 
•  Cogeneration 
•  Energy mches 
Figure 3  Variables affecting actual margins 
The impact of all  these individual positions is significant. As  may be  expected there 
will  be  a wide  range  about the  norm.  In  any  specific time-period  unforeseen  plant 
outages, off-specification product, shipping delays etc will further increase the offset 
from the marker GRM. The range is likely to be from nil, or even negative, up to $2-
3/bbl  (ECU  1.75 - 2.60/bbl).  For the  purposes  of illustrating  a typical  NW  Europe 
position an added NRM of say $1/bbl (ECU 0.90/bbl), by adding $0.50 I bbl for base 
load specials and for individual refinery optimisation, is indicated in Figure 4. 
$/bbl 
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Figure 4  Relation between marker margins and actual cash flows 
2.5.  Linkage between NRM and Net Income After Tax (NIAT) and profitability 
expressed as Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) 
Figure 4 shows the sequential build up from marker GRM to marker NRM, and then 
the addition of individual positions. To calculate NIAT it is now necessary to: 
•  Deduct depreciation, typically $0.50- 0.55/bbl (ECU 0.45- 0.50/bbl) 
•  Deduct tax.  The tax positions will  vary from  refiner to  refiner and  country to 
country. For this illustration a notional tax rate of 30% has been taken 
In this example the resultant NIAT is $0.60/bbl (ECU 0.55/bbl). 
For  a  typical  150,000  b/d  refinery  the  book  value  of the  assets  deployed  (Total 
Capital  Employed,  TCE),  being  the  written  down  value  of the  Plant  Property  and 
Equipment (PPE), plus value of stocks and  net liabilities may well  be of the order of 
ECU 700- 880 million (£800- $1000 million). 
A ROCE of, say, 4% then results, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 also shows the  calculation of cash  flow,  being  the  NIAT plus depreciation 
added  back.  This  cashflow  is  then  available  to  fund  dividends,  interest  and 
investments. 
It  is  important to  stress  that this  explanation  is  illustrative of the  financial  linkages 
involved. It does not attempt to show an accurate accounting view. 
2.6.  Measures of profitability 
Cost of capital 
In  order  for  shareholder  value  to  be  sustained  in  the  refining  industry,  new 
investments need  to  provide a post-tax return on  capital (ROC) at least equal to oil 
companies' weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  For an equivalent accounting 
return  on  existing  written  down  assets  (ROCE)  the  WACC  value  needs  to  be 
adjusted  to  reflect the  replacement  cost of existing  assets.  In  the  case  of the  EU 
refining  industry  this  adjustment  is  considerable  because  the  average  age  of 
European refining plant is 20 years. WACC, and therefore minimum required returns, 
for individual companies will vary from the industry average. 
The WACC is based upon estimates of the risk-free interest rate,  the general equity 
risk  premium,  beta  factors  for  the  industry  (a  measure  of volatility)  and  average 
gearing levels of the industry. For the European refining industry we have estimated 
WACC of 7.5 to 8.0% for new investments and an average ROCE on existing assets 
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of 11  to  12%,  as  a minimum to  maintain  shareholder value.  This  approach  is  the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Existing assets 
ROCE, as defined above, is the measure most often used to describe the profitability 
of existing assets. There are other measures for Return On  Investment (ROI),  such 
as  Return  On  Average  Capital  Employed,  (ROACE),  Return  On  Equity  (ROE), 
Return  on  Net  Assets  (RONA),  and  others.  All  have  their  own  definitions  and 
applicability.  A  discussion  on  their  respective  merits  is  outside  the  scope  of this 
appendix. 
New Investments 
Most important for the refining industry are the  measures that are used to describe 
the  profitability  of a  new  investment  proposal.  Again,  there  are  many  measures, 
including simple Payout Time and Net Present Value (NPV). 
For the  purposes of this  appendix only  one  is  described,  the  Real  Terms  Earning 
Power  (RTEP),  often  referred  to  as  the  Internal  Rate  of Return  (IRR).  This  is  the 
discount  rate  at which  the  net  cash  flow  of a  project  (investments  out  and  cash 
(earnings) in) is zero. Figure 5. 
Annual ca8b flow 
Year  2  3  4  5  6  n 
Capex out  (x)  (x)  (x)  n 
0 
Cash in  X  X  X  X  n 
Net cash flow  (x)  (x)  (x)  X  X  X  ... n 
Earning power is 
the discount rate at 
which NPV=O 
For  major  projects Industry will typically look for  a minimum RTEP of  8·10% (post-tax) 
Figure 5  Real terms earning power as a measure of profitability 
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Oil companies will typically set a screening rate for the  RTEP or IRR of between 8-
10%,  depending  on  size  of  project,  country/political  risk,  margin  risk  (as  for 
environmental investments in Europe at the moment) and other such factors. 
Note that a RTEP of say 8 % on  proposed new assets is  broadly comparable to a 
ROCE of 12 % on those assets at mid-life. Figure 6. 
ROCE% 
12  ------------·---·------::--;.:--~--.:.:--~-+---....,-=--:-::--::-:--:7.--~--------------------------------
0+--r~--------~--;---------~-----------..-• 
100 
% of capital cost 
which is 
undepreciated  50 
10 
10 
20 
20 
Figure 6  Time profile of profitability in terms of ROCE 
2. 7.  Capital charge 
A capital charge is not a measure of profitability. 
5  Years 
It is however a valuable tool. The capital charge concept is a means of expressing a 
one-off expenditure in the form of a cost per unit of time, or quantity. A capital charge 
is  the  margin that must be  earned  to give  a  preset earning  power on  capital;  i.e. 
Earning Power (EP) is  an  input to the calculation.  For example the required  RTEP 
may be set at 8%. 
Figure 7  illustrates  some  typical  capital  charges,  expressed  as  a  %  of capital  per 
annum. 
These capital charges are illustrative. 
Many detailed assumptions would lie behind the calculation of an actual case. These 
assumptions would include the profile of the income stream, the actual depreciation 
and tax regime and any investment incentives. 
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10 year lifetime  20 year lifetime 
Tax rate  Required earning power (RTEP)  Tax rate  Required earning power (RTEP) 
[%]  8%  10%  12%  [%]  8%  10"A.  12% 
0  15.5  17  1  18.8  0  10.6  12.3  14.2 
30  17 9  20 1  22 5  30  ® 
14 5  17 0 
50  21  0  24.2  27.5  50  14.4  17.6  20.8 
Figure 7  Capital charges for different project scenarios 
The  principle  illustrated  has  then  been  used  to  calculate  the  required  GRM  for  a 
variety of refining investments.  In this report we have taken 12% as a representative 
capital charge for new refinery investments. 
2.8.  Reinvestment economics and environmental investments 
To provide indicative reinvestment economics for refining we  have taken the  capital 
cost of a new 150-180,000b/cd complex refinery at ECU 1.3- 1.75 billion ($1.5- 2.00 
billion).  A capital  charge  of 12%  has  then  been  applied,  equivalent to  ECU  2.60  -
3.50/bbl ($3.00 - 4.00/bbl). 
Adding fixed costs and overheads at ECU  1.30/bbl ($1.50/bbl) gives: 
An indicative required complex margin,  GRM,  of ECU 3. 90 - 4. 80/bbl ($4. 50 -
5. 50/bbl) for a new refinery.  Figure 8. 
Should a new processing train be installed within an existing refinery there are major 
savings on  refinery infrastructure,  site,  roads,  offices,  perhaps jetties and  tankfarm. 
Thus: 
An indicative required complex margin,  GRM,  of ECU 2.90- 3.40/bbl ($3.30-
3. 90/bbl) for a brownfield expansion. Figure 8. 
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Greenfield 
• 150-180,000 bbl/d; 60M bbl/year 
• Complex refinmg 
• Capital cost $1.5-2.0 billion 
Capital charge 12% =  $3.0-4 0/bbl 
Plus fixed costs  $1. 50/bbl 
Requried complex 
margin (GRM)  $4.50-5 50/bbl 
Brownfield 
• Cost typically 60% of Greenfield 
Capital charge 15% =  $1  80-2 40/bbl 
Plus fixed costs  $1.50/bbl 
Requried complex 
margin (GRM)  $3.30-3. 90/bbl 
Figure 8  Required GRMs for new investment 
The same logic can  be applied to  foreseen  environmental investments. The  cost of 
meeting  the  European  Council  Common  Position  of 6/97  is  foreseen  to  be  of the 
order of Net  Present  Value  ECU  20bn.  We  have  assumed  this  is  split  into  ECU 
13.5bn capital expenditure and  ECU  6.5bn  NPV of operating expenditure.  A choice 
needs to be made of the appropriate capital charge.  For example, applying a capital 
charge of 12% gives: 
An indicative required complex margin for environmental investments of some 
ECU 0.50/bbl ($0.60/bbl), above that required for acceptable base profitability. 
600 
Environmental, cost estimate 1n  ECU 20 bn 
Commissions report  5.00 
Intake capacity  t 
OECD Europe= 14mb/cd  5 1 bn b/a  4.00 
Capital charge at 12% = $1  8bn  $0 4/bbl 
Required range for  environmental 
For  10.12% ROCE on existing nsets 
Additional fixed costs say  $ o.20/bbl  2·00  --------------------------------------··cu-n=eni-GR"M 
Required additional GRM  $ 0.60/bbl 
Figure 9  GRM required for environmental investment 
If allocated  over the  road  transport  fuels  volume  of around  1.85bn  barrels  this  is 
approximately 1 cent/litre. 
The same logic can be applied to the 2005 European Parliament targets of 4/97 and 
the Council indicative targets of 6/97.  The cost can  also be expressed as  cents/litre 
of transport fuels. 
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Total Cost  Cost $/bbl  Cost 
Bn ECU  Refinery Intake  $cllitre Transport Fuel 
Council "Common  20  0.60  1 
Position" 2000 (6/97) 
European Parliament  60  1..80  3 
2005 (4/97) 
Council "Indicative  45  1.35  2.35 
Targets" 2005 (6/97) 
2.9.  Worldwide Gross Refining Margins 1989 - 1996 
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7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
Singapore Duba1 (Cracking) 
Mediterranean Urals (Cracking) 
NW  Europe Brent (Cracking) 
US  Gu~  Coast WTI 
Mediterranean Urals (Hydrosk1mm1ng) 
NWEurope Brent (Hydrosk1mm1ng) 
0 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
$/bbl  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
NW Europe Brent (Hydroskimm1ng)  0.78  0.94  1 69  0.34  0.91  0.70  0.43  0 54 
NW Europe Brent (Cracking)  2.02  3.01  3 76  1.85  2 03  1.49  1.15  1 51 
Mediterranean Urals (Hydroskimmmg  0 58  1 59  0.87  0.68  0 75 
Mediterranean Urals (Cracking)  2.25  3 03  1 79  1.44  1 80 
US Gulf Coast WTI (Cracking)  1 40  1.84  1.17  0 59  0.63  1.24  0.82  0.75 
Singaport Dubai (Cracking)  3 57  4.75  6.26  3.93  4 32  2.97  2.35  3.10 
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3.  Changes in Refining 
3.1.  Refinery Candidates for Closure have known vulnerabilities 
Low supply/trading 
capability 
Low refining margins 
A poor performing complex refinery can be as 
vulnerable as a non-niche simple refinery 
Market 
The charts on the following pages show proposed changes to refining capacity 
already announced. Also indicated are refineries which under certain circumstances 
could be closure candidates on at least one of the criteria listed above. 
Note that these possibilities in no way suggest that particular refineries should close. 
In depth analysis would be needed in each case with particular emphasis on the 
supply envelope and operating performance. Some simple refineries have a 
geographic or niche advantage which make them highly profitable while a high 
conversion refinery might have serious dis-advantages which might make it a closure 
candidate. 
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3.4.  A  number of the lower complexity refineries will be among candidates 
for closure (excluding speciality refineries) 
Complexity 
Index 
20 
15 
10 
Large/ 
complex 
... 
......... ·: .. 
M1d srze/ 
complex 
Cumulat1ve rankmg 
. .  . . .  . ..... . .. 
Large  1 
'simple' & 
small 
complex 
. .  .  .  . 
Small 
srmple 
Western European Refineries grouped by complexity 
Poss1ble 
closure 
candidates 
• • Complexity 
•  Index 
4 
3 
0 
- • r-- . . - .  ,-.-.. 
Porto  Rome - Cressler Ltvomo -
Marghera- Rafflnerta  -Shell  Ag1p 
Agap  di Roma 
- .. - .  .  .--.. .  ,........  ............  .........  .....-
Tenertfe  Antwerp Cartagena  Notre  Frasstno, Fredericla  Kalund-
- CEPSA  Belgian  Murcta  Dame de  Mantova  -Shell  borg-
Refinmg  - Repsol Gravenchon - -ICIP  Statoil 
Corp  BP/Mob1l 
•.--. 
Thessa-
lonlki-
EKO 
Roland Berger's Equivalent Refining Capacity (ERC) methodology is a benchmarking tool. A refinery's 
complexity is calculated based upon Its types of unit, and their capacity  . 
. .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .. .  .. 
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5.  Hidden incentives and exit barriers 
Hidden  incentives  for  refining  operations  exist  across  the  whole  of the  European 
Community  on  a  national,  regional,  or  even  individual  basis.  Apart  from 
straightforward subsidies, examples of hidden subsidy include: 
•  aid grants for R&D 
•  concessional financing 
•  special tax treatment of profits or investments 
•  special  treatment  of  depreciation  costs,  write-down  timescales,  and  other 
accounting measures 
•  transfer pricing regulations, including geographic transfer of tax liabilities 
•  favourable land deals 
•  sponsored worker training 
•  infrastructure building 
•  abatement of environmental regulations 
•  subsidies for electricity from cogeneration plants 
In  addition,  there are also hidden exit barriers.  One example  is  linking of continued 
operation of a refinery  to  local  or national  concessions or permits  relating  to  other 
parts  of the  company's  operations.  In  the  past  this  may  also  have  extended  to 
upstream exploration and production concessions. 
Hidden  subsidies are,  by  their nature,  difficult to  uncover.  Nevertheless,  it  is  in  the 
Community's interest to eliminate as many of them as possible. 
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6.  Capacity Creep 
6.1.  An overview 
What is capacity creep? 
This  could  be  defined  in  many  different ways.  For  the  purpose  of this  report  the 
following is proposed: 
"Capa-:;ity creep is the growth of  refining capacity, other than due to new units,  which 
arises  from  the  technical  learning  curve  that  applies  to  all industries,  and which 
growth probably does not appear in the published statistics of  industry capacity" 
Is it important? 
Yes,  it can  lead to misunderstandings on  the true capacity of the industry and of the 
level of utilisation of that capacity. 
More significantly, it can influence perceptions of when high capacity utilisation might 
lead to prospects for improved profitability. 
How is capacity defined? 
The  most  common  way  of defining  capacity  in  refining  is  to  define  the  Intake 
Capacity of the crude oil distiller. This  is  often  called  the  Nameplate capacity of 
the refinery. The distiller is the first processing unit in the refinery and  separates the 
crude oil  into its constituent parts for further processing.  The  most common  unit of 
intake capacity in industry statistics is the volume measure of: 
"barrels per calendar day". normally abbreviated to bbl/cd, bled or BCD 
At country or European Union level, intake statistics are normally given in weight, not 
volume. The weight measure is normally tonnes. More on definitions in 3.6.2 below. 
Is this capacity a precise measure? 
Unfortunately not! And herein lies a major source of the confusion that often arises. 
Paragraph  6.3  below  gives  more  detail  on  the  many  factors  influencing  an 
understanding  of  "What  is  Capacity".  As  will  be  noted,  "capacity"  can  vary 
significantly depending on  the  crude oil and feedstocks being processed and  on  the 
processing conditions adopted. 
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Is the capacity stable over time, within a range? 
Again,  unfortunately  not.  This  appendix  gives  an  understanding  of  the  most 
important components of Technical Learning Curve in the refining industry. Opinions 
on  the  magnitude  of this  capacity  creep  on  an  EU-wide  basis  are  typically  in  the 
range 0.5 to 1-2% per annum. 
6.2.  More on definitions 
What is capacity creep? 
As outlined above, for the purpose of this project the following definition is used: 
"Capacity creep is  the growth of refining capacity,  other than  due  to 
new units,  which arises from  the  technical learning curve that applies 
to  all industries,  and which  growth  probably does  not appear in  the 
published statistics of  industry capacity." 
There  could  be  many  other  definitions.  The  Financial  Times  has  adopted  the 
following: 
''The  slow but measurable  process  whereby  technical  modification 
and debottlenecking  carried out on  refineries  increase  the  de  facto 
capacity of the  refinery  without  changing  the  nameplate  capacity of 
the unit.  Results in an overstatement of  capacity utilisation." 
Report COM(96)143 EN adopted: 
"An  industry term used to describe the  slow but steady expansion of 
actual  capacity  compared  to  the  nominal  capacity  of plant  that 
normally comes about as a result of ongoing improvements made by 
operators  to  plant,  for  example  by  way  of  the  removal  of 
de bottlenecks in the flow of  process liquids, etc." 
Whatever definition is adopted the important points to note are that: 
•  this  is  a  process  found  in  all  industries,  which  benefits  the  industry  and 
ultimately the consumer by making available low cost incremental capacity 
•  although capacity creep is measurable in  principle, in  practice it is unlikely to 
be  measured!  Thus,  it is  unlikely that much  of the  increase will  be  found  in 
statistics 
•  the cumulative effects of capacity creep, at company, country and  EU  Union 
levels, are significant 
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Are there different types of capacity creep? 
Yes, the lEA and some others have found it helpful to consider two categories (Other 
categorisations are possible): 
•  "Soft"  creep,  arising  from  management  processes  such  as  shorter 
shutdowns,  streamlining  operations  (e.g.  single  crude  operation),  IT 
improvements  etc.  This  type  of creep  is  not  readily  captured  in  published 
numbers. 
•  "Hard" creep, arising from changing equipment, adding new capacity etc. This 
type of creep is more likely to be captured in statistics, probably with a delay. 
For the purpose of this project creep has  not been  categorised,  as those whom we 
have interviewed have expressed their estimates in overall terms. 
What refinery units does it apply to? 
Capacity  creep  is  usually  referred  to  in  the  context  of  distilling  units.  Note  that 
'distilling  units  normally  means  'Atmospheric  Distillation'.  Vacuum  distillation,  a 
subsequent process  in  most refineries,  is  not included.  The  logic for this  is  that,  at 
the  level  of government and  the  lEA the  call  on  available  distillation  capacity is  of 
primary importance. 
Note, though, that capacity creep, driven by the technical learning curve, will apply to 
all  refinery units,  including  for example  product blending  capability and  jetties.  It  is 
significant for secondary  units if the  capacity of those  units  becomes  limiting.  This 
could  be  caused  be  tighter  environmental  legislation,  which  puts  pressure  on 
secondary capacity. 
Where do new units fit in? 
New units are not included in  the definition. A grey area may arise when a new unit 
replaces  an  old  unit  that  is  shutdown.  The  new  unit  will  incorporate  technical 
advances and may well be of higher capacity than the old. This net increase may not 
be  made visible.  This  is  unlikely to  be  a significant factor with  distillers,  in  that few 
are being built in a situation of overcapacity and low margins. 
However in any consideration of capacity creep in secondary units, for example new 
hydrodesulphurisers  driven  by  environmental  legislation,  much  greater  care  is 
needed.  Further,  although  any  new  unit  may  be  designed  tightly  to  its  nameplate 
capacity in  practice small improvements can  invariably be  achieved once the  unit is 
on stream. 
Intake capacity 
As above, the normal unit of intake is barrels per calendar day. 
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The "barrel" is a historical convention from the times when oil was literally shipped in 
barrels.  A barrel  is  defined  as  a US  barrel  of 34.9726  Imperial Gallons or 158.984 
Litres. There is no confusion here. 
"Per calendar day",  when  multiplied  by  365  days,  obviously gives  a figure  for the 
annual intake capacity. 
Confusion  can  arise  with  "barrels  per  stream day",  as  specific  circumstances  will 
decide how many days in any year any given distiller will be on stream. More on this 
below. 
Where  a weight measure  is  used,  typically at  country and  EU  Union  level,  this will 
normally  be  in  millions  or  thousands  of metric  tons,  each  of  1  OOOkg,  and  also 
referred to as a tonne. 
Whether the capacity is defined per calendar or stream day, or in volume or weight, 
the  fundamental  point  remains  that  the  definition  of capacity  depends  on  several 
important underlying assumptions each of which  is judgmental. There  is  no  right or 
wrong answer. 
6.3.  What factors inflence capacity? 
Number of days on stream 
The  distiller will  have  a  capacity,  each  day,  to  intake  so  many  barrels  of crude 
(barrels per stream day;  bbl/sd).  The  annual capacity is,  of course,  the daily intake 
times the number of days the unit is on stream. The number of stream days available 
will  depend  on  many  factors,  the  main  one  being  the  number  of shutdown  days 
required for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance work. 
Actual crude diet 
The processing configuration of the distiller is defined when the unit is designed and 
built. The configuration of a distiller is, in itself, complex. Crude oils have a very wide 
variation  in  the  proportions  of their  constituent  components.  Taken  together  this 
results  in  any  given  distiller having widely  varying  intake  capacities,  depending  on 
the crude being processed.  For example, a distiller able to handle 120,000 bbl/sd of 
say Brent crude may be able to handle only say 90,000 bbl/sd of a heavier crude at 
full capacity. 
Assumptions about density of crude intake 
Statistics at country level are normally in millions of tonnes per year. To convert from 
the  volume  measure  of  barrels  to  the  weight  measure  of tonnes  requires  the 
number  of barrels  to  be  multiplied  by  the  density,  expressed  as  weight  per  unit 
volume. 
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This density could be as actually measured over the year in the individual refineries. 
In  practice  it  will  be  an  assumed  or  deemed  number.  The  density  will  vary 
significantly, dependent on  the assumptions made about the typical crude diet of the 
refinery or company. For example UK crudes have an 'average' density of 0.836 and 
those of Venezuela 0.913, a difference of 9%.  (Source:  lEA).  There are much wider 
differences between individual crudes. 
Intake or output? 
Perhaps  illogically,  confusion  can  sometimes  occur between  intake  and  output.  In 
the  conventions  of the  oil  industry the  fuel  required  by  the  distiller to  process  the 
crude oil is taken from the output.  In other words 100 tonnes of input will give about 
98  tonnes of output from  the  distiller.  Over the  whole  refinery  1  00  tonnes of intake 
will  typically  produce  between  92-97  tonnes  of  output  depending  on  processing 
complexity. 
Refining is more than a distiller 
A refinery is  a highly complex factory.  At a constant intake level on  the distiller, but 
with different crude oils  being  processed,  the output of key products can  be  varied 
widely.  After  the  distiller  there  are  multiple  secondary  processing  units.  This  is 
followed  by  sophisticated  component blending  capabilities to  produced the finished 
products, motor gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and gasoil in particular. 
This  complex  frequently  has  the  ability  to  take  in  feedstocks  and  blending 
components after the distiller. In addition, by changing operating conditions, there is 
capability to vary the output of the key products widely. 
Taken all  together this can  mean a variation of say +/-20% of main products output 
while  the  distiller maintains  a constant  intake  expressed  in  bbl/sd.  Conversely,  for 
any  given  demand  the  capacity  of the  distiller will  vary  widely  depending  on  the 
feedstocks and processing route chosen. 
Is the industry reporting "accurate" figures? 
In general terms the answer is yes.  However for the reasons above there cannot be 
any single 'mathematically correct' definition of capacity. The variation, depending on 
the underlying assumptions taken, could be +/-5%; significant at the EU level. 
The industry has sophisticated sets of data covering the intake capacity and  typical 
yields for a wide variety of crude oils.  In providing data within their own organisation, 
and  to  governments  and  the  lEA,  companies  will  take  a view  on  the  appropriate 
average.  The  release  of data  to  journals  may  not  be  given  the  same  attention; 
further,  there may be  commercial  competitive reasons  not to  be  too  precise to the 
outside world on the available capacity of any given refinery. 
In  practice,  over  the  industry  and  over  a  year,  and  with  available  crudes  and 
feedstocks, the variations from all  the factors will  be  less than  the  range  on  a daily 
basis,  but  could  well  be  +/-5%  of nameplate  capacity.  With  a  refinery  distillation 
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capacity  in  the  European  Union of 600 to  650  million tonnes this  is  significant,  and 
sufficient to cause difficulty in understanding statistics. 
6.4.  Technical learning curve in refining 
Major overhauls 
All  refinery units require shutting down for periodic major overhaul.  For distillers the 
period  is  typically every three  to  four years.  Advances  in  materials  sciences,  non-
destructive on-line inspection and  other techniques enable the refiner to extend the 
period  between  major  overhauls.  Some  advanced  companies  are  at  a  five-year 
cycle. This represents a significant increase of available capacity. 
In  addition, there is a continuing trend for the  time that it takes to  complete a major 
overhaul to be shorter.  Here the main factors are those mentioned above, improved 
shutdown planning and advances in design. Advances in design enable major items 
of equipment to be isolated and worked on while the unit is on-stream, with lower net 
loss of capacity. 
On-stream factor 
With  high fixed  costs all  refiners have an  incentive to strive for improved on-stream 
availability.  There  are  two  components  of  on-stream  availability  between  major 
shutdowns.  Firstly the  number of unplanned  shutdowns,  secondly the  reduction  of 
available capacity while the unit remains on  stream.  Both will arise from unforeseen 
equipment difficulties. Technical and management process improvements result in  a 
steady improvement in available capacity. Other gains arise from the sparing of less 
reliable equipment, such as pumps and heat exchangers. 
Technological learning curve 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  research  activities,  which  work  through  to  significant 
debottlenecking of installed capacity.  For distillers, the most significant are advances 
in  the  design of the  trays  installed  in  the  columns to separate the fractions.  Gains 
here  can  be  spectacular,  at  may  tens  of  percent.  Other  minor  advances,  taken 
together, can be significant in total. 
Information  technology,  advanced  process  control,  on-line  optimisers  and 
sophisticated  supervisory  systems  all  work  towards  maximising  the  output  of 
valuable products from the distiller, increasing their production from any given intake 
of crude oil. This is a source of significant capacity increase. 
Economics & Scheduling activities 
A further component of capacity creep may arise from the ability to increase capacity 
for a short time.  This  can  be  by  moving  a  major shutdown  from  a  period  of high 
demand to one of lower demand when the loss of required capacity is lower. Further, 
throughputs  above  nameplate,  but  at a  lower overall  operating  efficiency,  can  be 
profitable in periods of rapidly moving prices. 
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Likewise,  when  capacity  becomes  limiting,  or  the  need  for  an  expensive  major 
debottleneck  is  looming,  the  attention  of  management,  technologists  and  E&S 
specialists  focuses  on  novel  and  cost  effective  ways  to  remove  the  constraint, 
accelerating capacity creep. 
It  should  be  recognised  that the  rate  of capacity  creep  will  have  boundaries  to  its 
range, limited by the rate of technical learning that underpins it. 
6.5.  Capacity utilisation 
As  will  be  clear,  any  work  to  define  capacity  utilisation,  based  on  supply/demand 
balances, will have to take into account all the points made. Assumptions will have to 
be made on each. 
At  best,  it  will  be  possible  to  make  an  informed  estimate.  This  can  give  rise  to 
misunderstandings of the actual capacity utilisation and of future trends. 
These considerations are  important whether the  rate  of demand  increase  is  low or 
high. 
If the  rate of demand  growth  is  low relative to  the  rate of growth of capacity in  the 
form of capacity creep then the under-utilisation will increase. 
If the rate of demand growth is  high  (probably for a specific product such as  diesel) 
or new specifications have to be met, then all the talents of the industry will focus on 
finding cost-effective ways of meeting these demands. The rate of capacity creep will 
then accelerate sharply. 
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Appendix  Seven
7. Taxation on TransPort Fuels
7.1. The Effect of Taxation on Gasoline  and Diesel Demand
In Europe the tax incentives offered for diesel are greater than those found
elsewhere  in the world.
".-"iS$sd':"P I  Ex-tax E Tax
In France where diesel has had a sustained tax advantage, the new registration
share of diesel vehicles has grown fast to reach 47o/o in 1995.
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Appendix Seven
The UK example shows no direct correlation  between the level of tax difference and
the relative growth of diesel registrations.  There is therefore no easy solution to the
mogas / diesel problem without major reverse discrimination.
UK diesel market development
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Even if there is no further increase in the o/o of diesel car registrations  the imbalance
will increase in the medium term.
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9.  Costs of Refinery Closures 
The  cost of refinery closures  has  been  estimated  at ECU  50m  to  ECU  200m  per 
refinery. 
Aspects of closure include: 
Gas freeing 
Dismantling of plant 
Cleaning of process plant 
General demolition expenses 
Site clean-up costs 
Redundancy costs 
A number of factors influence the site clean-up cost: 
Size of refinery 
Complexity of refinery 
Type of crude run 
Age of refinery 
Location, including 
Type of soil 
National remediation standards applicable 
Intended use after clean-up 
Water-courses and other sensitive environment surroundings 
Site clean-up costs can in some cases exceed ECU  100 million, but average about 
ECU 60 million. Redundancy and staff redeployment costs are the next largest item -
averaging around ECU 40m for a refinery with 250 employees. 
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10.  Interviews 
Agip  Danish government 
BP  Dutch government 
Cepsa  European Commission, DG IV 
Concawe 
Conoco 
Elf Aquitaine 
EuroPIA 
Exxon 
Holborn refinery 
lEA 
lnstitut Francais du Petrole 
KBC 
KPI 
Mobil 
Motor Oil Hellas 
MWV 
Neste 
OMV 
Petrofina 
Petrogal 
Repsol 
RWE IDEA 
SARAS 
Shell 
Statoil 
Texaco 
Total 
UOP 
UPEI 
Wintershall 
Finnish government 
French government 
German government 
Irish government 
Italian government 
Spanish government 
UK government 
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11.  Briefing Document for Interviewers 
What is current position? 
What are the fundamental causes of low INDUSTRY refining profitability? 
•  What  is  your assessment  of the  industry's  profitability  and  (in  confidence) 
your own? 
What would be a an acceptable/desirable level of profitability? 
What is going to change and what does this mean for future profitability? 
Motivation and rationale 
Does low industry profitability matter and why? 
Why has it not been self-correcting? 
Why do existing players continue to take the pain of poor profitability? 
Impact of  marketing 
What developments in marketing are impacting on refining and how? 
What is  the  impact on  the  industry of oil  products  becoming  increasingly a 
commodity? 
How has/will the  imbalance between  gasoline and  diesel  impact on  refining 
profitability? 
Will the introduction of the Euro have any effect? 
Shareholder pressures 
Why is  shareholder value  for refining  apparently not a  sufficiently  sensitive 
stockmarket issue? 
Why are refining and marketing not decoupled to highlight poor profitability? 
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Company strategies 
How does your company's strategy for refining differ from competitors'? 
What key factors influence your views on closing own capacity? 
How important is the growing presence of oil producing countries to refining in 
the EU? 
How do you expect your own Company strategies to impact on  profitability in 
refining? 
Government actions 
Are EU/Government policies distorting refining profitability and if so how? 
How do tightening environmental standards really affect the refining industry? 
How would it help the industry to have a level playing field on energy taxes? 
What  is  the  "Security  of Supply"  issue  and  how  important  is  it  to  have 
indigenous capacity? 
What should now be done? 
What can we learn from other industries experience? 
What  lndustry/EROPIA/Company  mechanisms  or strategies  would  improve 
and sustain INDUSTRY profitability 
What EU/Government mechanisms or strategies would  improve and  sustain 
INDUSTRY profitability? 
What are the obstacles to mergers? 
Next steps 
What are  the  top  5 actions you  believe  RB  &  P should  recommend  to  the 
Commission? 
May we  come  back  to  you  to  test  the  thoughts/proposals  arising  from  our 
evaluation? 
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